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Abstract
This thesis aims to provide new insights on the functioning of financial markets.
In particular, I focus on European markets with the final objective of uncovering im-
portant evidences for the implementation of policies aimed to improve the resiliency of
the financial system to economic crises.
In the thesis, I tackle two important issues present in the financial literature. In
chapters II and III I study the effects of the credit cycle on firm’s choice of debt
structure whereas in Chapter IV I investigate the relative pricing of sovereign credit
risk by studying the relationship between sovereign CDS spreads and sovereign yields,
for European countries, during and after the sovereign debt crisis.
Chapter II is dedicated to the study of firm’s choice of funding and its relationship
with the evolution of the credit cycle. Using a sample of U.S. and European firms, I
document the existence of a credit substitution channel between loans and bonds that
reduces the adverse effect of a shrink in credit supply. Moreover, I also report estimates
on the degree of substitution. In particular, I investigate on the ability of firms to fully
substitute between the two forms of debt, and I find that firms in Eurozone countries
can only partially substitute bank debt with market debt.
In Chapter III I extend the findings of the previous chapter providing evidences on
the the existence of an asymmetric effect when including in the analysis also lenders’
characteristics. Main lenders’ financial soundness, and the practice of relationship
lending, contribute to reduce the necessity for firms of modifying their debt structure
when the credit cycle is at a through.
in Chapter IV I document that a distress puzzle at the sovereign level emerges
during the crisis period for the Eurozone countries, and I offer empirical evidence on
the theoretical relationship between CDS spreads and bond yields, before and after
the ECB intervention. I estimate a contingent claim model for sovereign credit risk,
and shed light on the relationship between risk and return for sovereign securities.
Further, I test the profitability of arbitrage strategies that exploit deviations from
the equilibrium condition. Finally, I observe that after the launch of the Outright
5
Monetary Transaction (OMT) Programme, by the European Central Bank, the relative
mispricing of the sovereign credit risk has strongly reduced
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I. Introduction to the thesis
In the thesis, I tackle two important issues present in the financial literature. In chapters
II and III I study the effects of the credit cycle on firm’s choice of debt structure. Using
a sample of U.S. and European firms, I document the existence of a credit substitution
channel between loans and bonds that reduces the adverse effect of a shrink in credit supply.
Moreover, I also report estimates on the degree of substitution. In particular, I investigate
on the ability of firms to fully substitute between the two forms of debt. In chapter III I
study how external factors related to lenders’ characteristics affect the substitution channel
and in turns firms’ choices. In the last part of the thesis I switch the focus on sovereigns.
In chapter IV I investigate the relative pricing of the sovereign credit risk by studying the
relationship between sovereign CDS spreads and sovereign yields, for European countries,
during and after the sovereign debt crisis.
Chapter II is dedicated to the study of firm’s choice of funding and its relationship with
the evolution of the credit cycle. Large amount of literature has been dedicated to banks and
their role of financial intermediation capable of reducing transaction costs and asymmetric
information problems that plague the financial market. Banks extend credit to households
and firms that otherwise would have been rationed. By extending credit to the real economy,
banks boost consumption and investments, which are two of the main component that form
the GDP. Thanks to their ability of mitigating agency costs, financial intermediaries have
always been a key source of funding for firms –especially for small and medium sized ones.
Some of the most influential authors to discuss the importance of intermediaries as possible
solution to inefficiencies of financial markets were Diamond (1984), Dewatripont, Tirole, et al.
(1994) and Freixas and Rochet (1997). Nevertheless, many economists saw the coexistence
of financial markets and financial intermediaries as a temporary condition that would cease
with the improvement of financial markets efficiency over time. According to this school of
thought, the more efficient financial markets should have replaced financial intermediaries
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because investors prefer to use markets for smoothing their consumption by transferring
savings across time and not paying any intermediation fee. While the assertion is partly
true, we did not observe –until the financial crisis- a shrinkage of banks; if something the
banking system enlarged to the point in which few large banks were dominating the entire
banking industry.
Two elements played a role in the persistent importance of the banking system. The
first is the enlargement of the core business of banks. As markets became more efficient a
conspicuous part of the pool of potential borrowers moved to the relatively cheaper bonds’
market. As a response, banks modified their business model to enlarge their scope by offering
additional fee-paying financial services. On the other hand, not all the financial markets
developed at the same pace across the world (not even across developed countries). On
this issue Allen and Santomero (2001) reports that the size of the banking industry did not
shrink overall; thus supporting the hypothesis that bank credit is not fully substitutable
with market debt and that financial intermediaries still maintain a key role in the financial
system.
The role of banks in the economy lead researchers to investigate the relationship between
the availability of bank credit and the economic cycle. From a regulators point of view
providing evidences of a causal relationship going from the bank credit supply to the economic
cycle (and in particular that a shortage of bank funding is detrimental for the economic
recovery) have important implications for the implementation of policies aimed to improve
the resiliency of the financial system to economic crises. As discussed, the inefficiencies of the
market leave space to financial intermediaries’ activity. Nonetheless, bank debt and market
debt are substitutable only to a certain extent. In countries like U.S. where the competition of
financial markets is strong, the banks had to be entrepreneurial and change their approach to
the intermediation business. An example is the development of the syndicated loans market
that has been a major achievement for financial intermediaries in U.S., and more recently in
Europe. Nevertheless in Europe, and in countries like Japan, banks still play a leading role
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as intertemporal smoother thus making the core commercial banking business still profitable.
In addition to this argument the traditional business of banks is still of high value as a mean
of transmitting central bank’s monetary policy; conventional and most of the unconventional
ones as well.1
In Chapter III I extend the findings of the previous chapter by considering additional
external factors that influence the credit cycle. In particular, I document the existence
of an asymmetric effect when including in the analysis also lender characteristics. Main
lenders’ financial soundness, and the practice of relationship lending, contribute to reduce
the necessity for firms of modifying their debt structure when the credit cycle is at a through2.
Another observed empirical fact is that while capital markets are stable, bank credit
supply is very volatile resulting in a less reliable source of funding for periods in which
funds are most in demand. The highly volatile and pro-cyclical bank credit supply can
eventually lead to a severe economic recession. To overcome this issue, and to obtain more
stable funding, firms often create links with one or more banks by repeatedly interacting
with them overtime. The link formed between the lending bank and the borrowing firm
has been denominated in the literature “relationship lending”. The existence of relationship
lending allows firms to maintain a cheaper and more secure source of funding through reduced
transaction costs, and a much reduced information asymmetry.
It is now clear that from an economic theory perspective, scholars accept that the bank’s
credit cycle directly affects the real economy. A reduction in credit supply could in fact
exacerbate the effects of an economic downturn. The empirical observation of these theo-
retical predictions open the doors to several interesting macro-prudential implications. The
objectives of the regulators should be to provide buffers to the economy such that when the
crisis hit economic agents are not affected too severely.
1The Fed in 2008 revived a provision in Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. Under this provision,
the Fed was allowed to extend credit to non-bank financial firms (thus not directly supervised by the central
bank). Despite more risky in principle the loans turn in a profit of around $30 billion for the Fed.
2The notion of main lender and relationship lender will be defined in Chapter III
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The correct functioning of the capital markets is of fundamental importance for the
substitution channel to work, and regulators should take continuous effort to improve the
efficiency of the financial structure. However, since the development of capital markets is not
uniform even across developed countries, we do observe failures in the effectiveness of the
substitution channel. This is the case in Europe, where the banking system is dominant com-
pared to financial markets. The solution that many firms adopt is to release soft information
to some lenders that allows them to obtain cheap funds when the costs of borrowing are high,
thus providing an alternative to the bond market substitution. While relationship lending
is a well-known solution to get funding for the more opaque small and medium enterprises,
with the development of the syndicated loans market a strong firm-bank link proved to be
valuable also for bigger corporations that could raise large amounts from a syndicate whose
lead arranger is informed. A syndicated loan is much more similar to a bond compared to a
bilateral loan while retaining most of the advantages of a loan in terms of renegotiation.
From a corporate finance perspective, the link with a bank allows firms to have a sta-
ble source of funding which is particularly important in periods with tight credit but also
concedes monopoly rents to the superiorly informed bank. Firms face a trade-off between
the stability of bank’s funding and the amount of information they would like to release
to the bank. In other words, firms will have to choose the right amount of bank credit to
circumvent the market power that the informed bank acquires. The link between the bank
credit and economic activity therefore should be even stronger than previously hypothesized
if it is found that a long-term relationship with a bank reduce the adverse effect of a crisis for
the firm. This has also implications from a macroeconomic point of view. The presence of
relationship lending could modify the way the monetary policy affects real activity through
the lending channel especially when there is a credit crunch.
Finally, in Chapter IV I show that after the launch of the Outright Monetary Transaction
(OMT) Programme, by the European Central Bank, the relative mispricing of the sovereign
credit risk has strongly reduced. I disentangle the effects of the ECB intervention on the
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sovereign credit risk market in different ways. I offer empirical evidence on the theoretical
relationship between CDS spreads and bond yields, before and after the ECB intervention,
across Eurozone and No Eurozone countries. Then, I estimate a contingent claim model for
sovereign credit risk, and shed light on the relationship between risk and return for sovereign
securities. Further, I test the profitability of arbitrage strategies that exploit deviations from
the equilibrium condition.
The positive relationship between risk and expected return is one of the milestones in
financial theory. Investors choose to buy risky assets by looking at risk-adjusted returns.
The higher is the risk associated to a given investment, the higher must be the expected
return. Hull, Predescu, and White (2004) find that conditional on the absence of frictions
in the market, a portfolio including CDS and bond, issued by the reference entity, generates
cash flows equal to a riskless bond in all states of the world. Hence, the CDS premium
should be equal to the excess risky yield over the risk-free rate.
Compared to the related literature in Palladini and Portes (2011), Arce, Mayordomo,
and Pena (2013), and Fontana and Scheicher (2016) the investigation extend the analysis to
the period following the ECB intervention, including also countries outside the Eurozone,
with the aim of highlighting the differential effects of the unconventional monetary policy.
The empirical contradiction of the positive relationship between risk and expected return
is known in the financial literature as distress puzzle.
The distress puzzle is different from a temporary mispricing condition as documented for
both corporate (Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005), Blanco, Brennen, and Marsh (2005)),
and sovereign securities (Palladini and Portes (2011), Arce et al. (2013), Fontana and Sche-
icher (2016)). These papers argue that CDS spreads are faster in price discovery, thus react-
ing quicker to changes in credit condition. As a consequence, the relationship CDS spread
- bond spread does not hold in the short-term. However, they show that CDS spreads and
bond yields exhibit strong co-movements in a long-term perspective.
Chapter IV documents that a distress puzzle at the sovereign level emerges during the
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crisis period for the Eurozone countries. The mispricing is not temporary and cannot be
arbitraged away by investors. Indeed, I observe that the mispricing is ruled out only after
the launch of the OMT programme.
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II. Loan to Bond Substitution: An Empirical
Analysis on the Functioning of the Substitution
Channel for Eurozone Firms
15
1. Introduction
Theoretical literature on the credit cycle strongly supports the hypothesis that bank
lending is pro-cyclical and that credit supply significantly affects real economy.
Plenty of literature investigated the link between bank lending and the business cycle both
from a theoretical and from an empirical point of view. Unfortunately, verifying empirically
the theoretical predictions has proved hard. In fact, while credit shrinks unambiguously
during crises, it is not clear if this reduction is driven by a reduction in supply or in demand.
A shift in demand is not as interesting to study as a shift in supply. A decline in demand
for credit implies that there are no good investment opportunities for potential borrowers to
invest on, thus the reduction in credit is not hindering economic growth. On the opposite,
an inward shift in supply means that despite potential borrowers apply for bank loans, large
part of them is rejected by the bank. The reduction in credit supplied by banks prevents
borrowers from investing in good projects, and in turn affects negatively the real economy.
Crucial to the evolution of credit supply are also central banks’ policies. During the most
recent financial crisis, the ECB pledged to massively inject liquidity in the economy, but it
soon realised that the liquidity programs were not working as expected because banks were
just storing the extra-liquidity in the central bank deposit facility. ECB then tweaked its
policy to make liquidity available to banks only conditional on banks lending out money to
the real economy thus recognising the importance of the lending channel of monetary policy
for economic growth. 3
The issue of discriminating between the reduction in credit supply and demand has been
tackled in the empirical literature by several authors. Different methodologies have been
proposed to identify loan supply movements. Leary (2009) uses a quasi-natural experiment
setup that focus on two particular events in 1961 and in 1966 that he believes determined
3The targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs) are an example of this kind of facility
enacted by ECB. TLTROs are targeted operations, as the amount that banks can borrow is linked to their
loans to non-financial corporations and households.
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some changes in bank funding constraints; Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein (1994), and more
recently Becker and Ivashina (2014) have tackled this very interesting question using the
demand for credit from individual firms and excluding altogether observations in which no
credit was demanded.
Following the strategy first introduced by Kashyap et al. (1994) to overcome the identifi-
cation issue, I will test the hypothesis of the existence of a loan-to-bond substitution channel
for Eurozone firms by including in the sample only firm-quarters in which firms actually
demand credit either in the form of loan or bond. This empirical strategy exploits observed
changes in the composition of firms’ source of funding over the business cycle to identify
inward shifts in the supply of loans, and consequently an increase in bond financing.
To the best of my knowledge, no evidences have been presented on the existence of
the loan to bond substitution channel and its functioning related to the credit cycle for
Eurozone firms. This chapter extends the existing literature along two dimensions: by
providing evidences on the substitution channel for Eurozone firms, and by investigating
further in the issue to shed light on the degree of substitutability between loans and bonds.
The first contribution extends the previous evidences on the loan-to-bond substitution
channel to Eurozone firms. The different structure of the financial system between U.S.
and Europe as documented in Langfield and Pagano (2016), and the different pace of the
development of other credit market such as the syndicated loan market, limit the generalisa-
tion of Becker and Ivashina (2014) outside U.S.. An analysis that specifically targets firms
operating in the Euro area is required to draw conclusions on the effect of the substitution
channel in Europe given the structural differences between the two financial systems.
Using data from Dealscan for syndicated loans, and from Thomson One banker for bonds
I carry out the analysis on the existence and the direction of the loan-to-bond substitution
channel using different macroeconomic measures of aggregate credit conditions. The lending
variables of interest can be thought as proxies for the credit conditions in each macro-area
analysed (i.e. US and Eurozone), and are collected for Eurozone firms either directly from
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the ECB statistical warehouse website or computed using accounting data from Compustat
global. Data for U.S. firms are compiled from the Fed of st Louis website, Compustat North
America, and the Call reports of big banks.
Previous empirical literature uses a simple indicator as dependent variable. The choice
of the indicator presents two main problems. First, firm-quarters in which both loans and
bonds are issued cannot be identified, and thus must be dropped from the sample. Second,
the indicator variable cannot capture a partial substitution. My approach uses amounts to
tackle the two problems above. The dependent variable in this analysis instead of being a
simple indicator is a ratio of the total amount raised through loans in a given firm-quarter -
expressed in US Dollars - to the total amount of funds borrowed in the quarter. This way to
define the dependent variable allows retaining in the sample also firm-quarters in which both
bank loans and bonds are included, and that would have been excluded if a dichotomous
dependent variable were chosen. The variable will behave exactly as an indicator variable if
in a given quarter a firm only issues bonds or only issues loans. However, when a firm raise
funding from both bonds and bank loans in the same quarter, we would observe a number
included between 0 and 1.
As second contribution to the literature, I introduce a regression specification that is
capable of identifying the degree of substitution between loans and bonds for the firms in
the sample. The higher the substitutability between bank loans and corporate bonds, the
milder will be the adverse effect on the economy of a decline in funds loaned by banks. The
well-functioning of this effect opposes to the cyclicality of the credit supply and help faster
economic recovery.
Assuming the well-established result on the existence of the substitution channel, further
investigation is required to clarify whether the total amount that was obtained in period of
high credit supply is entirely substituted by bonds when credit condition deteriorates. To
test this hypothesis I use the total amount of funds raised by firms in each quarter, and
check whether this amount changes significantly with credit conditions. If firms are able
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to fully substitute their bank loans with bonds we should not observe any effect on the
total amount of debt raised by firms. A signed coefficient (where the sign depends on the
explanatory variable used in the regression specification) would be an indication that firms
can only partially substitute bank debt with bonds, and therefore they can raise less funds
thus possibly foregoing profitable investment opportunities.
At this point one might argue that the use of amounts might be suspicious because
amounts are influenced by firms’ investment opportunities, which during crises can be much
reduced. Indeed, during crises, by using the amounts we could observe partial substitution
just because the firms do not have enough investment opportunities to require additional
debt. I address these concerns by further filtering the data. In particular, I apply two
alternative filters that should leave in the sample only firms with stable demand for funds.
The first filter restricts the sample to firms whose standard deviation of assets from the
mean over the time series is small. This filter ensure that only firms with stable demand
for funding to finance their assets are included in the sample. The second filter retain in
the sample only firms in sectors less affected by the business cycle and more likely to have
longer-term investment projects thus needing constant funding.
This chapter contributes to the literature by enhancing the understanding of the link
between bank debt and market debt in the Eurozone. This implication is particularly im-
portant for small firms that usually rely heavily on bank loans, and are likely to be excluded
from the credit market during crises. 4 Inefficiencies arise whenever those firms for which the
switch between the two forms of financing is curtailed are firms with positive NPV projects.
In other words when the firms are profitable is inefficient to scale them back, and eventually
shut them down.
In this analysis I find that firms based in the Eurozone are able to substitute between
loans and bonds as a response to changing credit conditions; yet the substitution is only
partial, and firms will end up raising less funds than needed. Despite the bank-centric feature
4I must be careful in generalising given that borrower in the syndicated loan market are often large firms
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of the European financial market that encourages firms to rely a lot on bank loans, we still
observe substitution to bonds; although the direction of the substitution in some specification
contrasts the findings in the literature. Firms in the Eurozone choose to substitute from loans
to bonds especially in periods in which the banking sector is in distress or periods related
to policies implemented by the central bank to enhance credit. Comparing the results with
those obtained for U.S. firms (here provided as benchmark) requires an in-depth analysis
on the role of the banking system versus the financial market in Europe and U.S.. The
policy implications of having results different from those observed in the U.S. might be very
relevant. The divergence in the results might indicate that policies enacted by the Fed in
U.S. might not be the best fit for European system, and thus ECB should tackle similar
problems differently. The expansive central bank monetary policies, that in principle should
have affected positively also bank lending, did not work as expected along this transmission
channel because of the tendency of banks to hoard the extra liquidity received from the ECB
in order to be prepared to face sudden shortages in liquidity.
A possible solution to resolve the discrepancies would be to implement structural reforms
of the financial system to close the gap in efficiency between the U.S. and the European
capital markets with the final objective of harmonising regulation where possible.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 is a review of the related
literature, Section 3 describes the data and explain the empirical strategy of the analysis,
Sections 4 presents the results of the empirical analysis both for the main specification and
for the partial substitution analysis, Section 5 reports the robustness checks, and Section 6
concludes the chapter.
2. Literature Review
Empirical observation of the credit cycle shows that the demand and supply of credit
are often misaligned. The cyclical nature of credit supply does not always match the credit
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demand that despite being cyclical it has been shown to vary less than the supply. According
to the Austrian theory of the business cycle, it is believed that bank credit is a main deter-
minant of the business cycle. The outcome from the theory is that when the credit supply
is excessive, and the price of bank debt is too low, we observe an investment boom whereas
tight credit and high prices determine economic recession. During a credit boom the risk of
inefficiently financing bad projects rise sensibly. Only a finite number of good projects are
available in the economy. Excessive supply leads the bank to fund also bad projects that
turn out in a loss for the bank, and might kick start the descending phase of the cycle. The
Austrian theory seems consistent with events occurring during the financial crisis in 2007.
Before the crisis, interest rates were too low and banks were funding non-profitable projects.
With the advent of the crisis, firms were demanding credit in excess with respect to the
supply. For an equilibrium argument, the high demand transposed in an interest rates hike,
and at the same time bank credit supply tightened considerably.
While it is clear that the level of credit supply is correlated with the business cycle, the
extensive theoretical literature produced on the link between credit supply and business cycle
has proved hard to test empirically over the years. Substantial body of empirical work that
relates loans to macroeconomic conditions and the monetary policy has been produced in
the early 90s’ with influential works of Romer and Romer (1994) and Bernanke and Blinder
(1992). Nevertheless, the idea that the lending channel and the money channel were two
separate mechanisms for the transmission of monetary policy is even older, and dates back
to Tobin and Brainard (1963). All of the papers mentioned examine how different indicators
respond to a shift in monetary policy, and they consistently find that a contraction in the
monetary policy leads to a fall in bank lending. However, these papers were lacking a clear
identification strategy to conclude causation.
Kashyap et al. (1994) brought new empirical evidences using a novel identification strat-
egy of the lending channel as a way to transmit monetary policy. Previous research focus
on how bank assets and liabilities responded to policy impulse. The latter strategy clearly
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suffers from endogeneity problems. Indeed, a negative response in the assets and liabilities
might be the result of a decline in firm’s output that leads to a drop in demand for credit.
Kashyap et al. (1994) methodology utilizes data on commercial papers and bank loans to
untangle credit demand and credit supply. The objective of the paper is to identify the
effect of a monetary contraction on the supply of bank credit. Kashyap et al. (1994) do
so by observing that if a firm stop borrowing from banks following a reduced demand for
credit -due to the lack of investment opportunities- one should expect that also the demand
for other sources of financing, such as commercial papers, would decline or at least would
not increase. If instead the tightening monetary policy affects negatively the supply of bank
credit, and not the demand, we should observe an increase in commercial paper issuance as
long as firms are able to substitute the two forms of financing relatively easily.
Leary (2009) focus on the relevance of credit supply and capital market frictions in
determining the structure of liabilities for firms. Conversely to Modigliani and Miller (1958)
he claims that the structure of firm’s liabilities is not relevant. Leary (2009) uses the fact
that the supply of funds is not infinitely elastic, and thus supply conditions matters in
the structure of the liabilities of a firm. Leary (2009) focus on two changes in bank funding
constraint that happened in 1961 and in 1966 to study the effect on firms’ financial structure.
The first event is the development of the market for certificates of deposit that emerged in
1961. Leary (2009) believes that this event is an indicator for loosening funding constraint.
The second event is the credit crunch of 1966 in U.S. in which the tight funding constraints
were a consequence of government policies that restrained credit. The finding of Leary (2009)
provides support to the hypothesis that the credit supply and the segmentation of the market
for corporate bonds significantly affects the firm’s capital structure choice, and in turns affects
firm’s value. He observes that following an expansion in the availability of bank loans, bank
dependent firms saw their leverage ratios increasing consistently more than the leverage ratio
of firms with access to the public debt market. 5 Leary (2009) exploits this differential in
5Large firms are less likely to be affected as they are less sensitive to credit supply shrinkages Holmstrom
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sensitivity to credit supply shocks to study the effect of supply frictions on capital structure.
The paper is relevant in providing evidences on the relationship between firms’ financing
decisions and the costs segmenting the debt market (e.g. transaction costs and asymmetric
information). Firms, by choosing their relatively cheaper source of financing in response to
an imbalance between credit demand and credit supply can enhance their value, whereas the
effects of debt market segmentation keep some firms - with certain specific characteristics
- with few alternatives to bank loans thus depressing their value. Despite the interesting
results, Leary (2009) presents a problem in the identification strategy. There is reason to
believe that the two events used to carry out the analysis might be related to changes in
credit supply, it is more difficult to believe that a coefficient associated to this event is free
of endogeneity problems.
Peek and Rosengren (2000) using the quasi-natural experiment set-up provided by the
Japanese banking crisis, focus on how a loan supply shocks might affect real economic activity
in U.S.. They claim that the shock affecting Japanese banks at the time of the crisis could
have had a direct impact on construction activities in U.S. real estate market due to the
depth of penetration of Japanese banks in the U.S. credit market. They conclude that the
shock to the loan supply as identified by the Japanese banking crisis ultimately had real
effects on the economic activity in U.S.. According to Peek and Rosengren (2000), previous
studies on credit cycle -even when able to isolate the effect of a shock to the supply of credit-
were not able to identify the effect this shock has on real economy. Their finding, in contrast
with previous literature, suggests that when the bank loan supply is low, firms have hard
time in substituting bank debt and this eventually result in lower investments, which hinder
real economic activity. 6
Related to this body of literature is also Chava and Purnanandam (2011). Their findings
suggest that adverse shocks to the credit supplied by banks, result in negative performances
and Tirole (1997)
6Literature on the relationship between credit cycles and real activity usually finds that firms have some
flexibility over the possible source of financing
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of bank’s related borrowers. Indeed, firms that relied heavily on banks’ capital, suffered
larger losses -according to a set of indicators provided- when the supply of bank loans shrunk
compared to those firms that had access to the public debt market. In line with Peek and
Rosengren (2000) they find that firms were not able to extensively substitute their source
of financing even when profitable (see results in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)). Chava and
Purnanandam (2011) empirical strategy uses the Russian crisis of 1998 as indicator for a
shock in the U.S. supply of loans. In order to provide a more reliable identification of the
loan supply shock, they compared banks that were affected by the shock because of their
substantial exposure with Russia, and banks that were not. They find that banks affected
by the crisis reduced consistently their lending and increased interest rates compared to
non-affected banks.
Becker and Ivashina (2014) provides a more recent empirical paper on the credit cycle.
Resorting to the methodology presented first in Kashyap et al. (1994) they try to quantify
fluctuations in the bank loan supply by studying firms’ substitution between loans and
bonds. Using publicly traded bonds data instead of commercial papers as in Kashyap et al.
(1994) they isolate the effect of a loan supply contraction by including in their dataset only
firms with positive external funding demand (either bond or bank loan) and interpret a
substitution from loan financing to bond financing as a contraction in bank-credit supply.
In the paper, they provide evidences of substitution when lending standards and monetary
policy are tight, when aggregate lending is low, and in case of poor bank performance.
Another piece of evidence relevant for the understanding of the thesis is provided in
Langfield and Pagano (2016). In their paper they provide data about the disproportion-
ately strong bank based financial structure in Europe that grew at a pace much faster than
European countries own economies and of most of the other banking system, whereas the
capital market did not developed accordingly. The data provided in their paper picture the
European banking system as the world’s largest one with a total asset value in 2013 equal to
334% of EU GDP in contrast with the Japanese banking system (196% of Japan’s GDP) and
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the U.S. one (88% of US GDP). Their findings support the conclusions of the first part of
this thesis dedicated to the debt structure. Untapped public debt market is leaving banks as
the main liquidity providers for firms especially in period of downturns. When banks expe-
rience a shortage of funds, the underdevelopment of the corporate bond market exacerbate
the effect of a crisis.
Beside the risk-sharing reason, many factors drive the firm’s optimal choice between a
bank based and a market based financial system. Banks are able to collect private infor-
mation that enables them to discriminate better between insolvent firms - which should
be shut down - and firms who are simply experiencing liquidity shortfalls and that should
be financed anyways. This though comes at the cost of releasing soft information to the
bank, thus granting an information advantage over other banks and reducing competitive-
ness. Langfield and Pagano (2016) propose solutions to rebalance the European financial
system. While recognizing that recent reforms on supervision and bank resolution are a step
toward a more efficient financial structure overall, they suggest that security markets across
Europe should be integrated forming a capital market union with low transaction costs,
greater standardisation, and greater liquidity of corporate bonds and asset backed securities
markets.
While many authors tend to accept the hypothesis that both bank credit demand and
supply is pro cyclical, theoretical literature often finds the opposite. Diamond (1991) develop
a theory of individual and aggregate loan demand in which firms with average credit ratings
in normal periods tend to rely more on bank credit. However, in periods of high interest
rates also borrowers with the highest credit rating choose to borrow from banks. Diamond
(1991) make the distinction between non-monitored funding identified as market debt and
monitored funding which is identified as bank loan. The reason to identify the two forms
of financing as market debt and bank debt respectively come from the fact that monitoring
of private information is most efficiently delegated to a financial intermediary, while having
many smaller investors as in the case of the corporate bonds market makes monitoring
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difficult. Diamond (1991) finding relates to the reputation cost of defaulting, which is much
higher for highly rated firms. For this class of firms monitoring is unnecessary compared
to firms with lower rating for which the reputation cost of defaulting is relatively low and
monitoring is necessary to avoid defaults. According to this theory in periods of high interest
rates also higher rated borrowers need monitoring; consequently a higher fraction of bank
loans are issued with respect to periods with lower interest rate. Moreover, the need for
monitoring of highly rated firms in periods of high interest rates makes the average quality
of new loans higher.
In line with Diamond (1991), Rajan (1992) affirms that the cost of bank financing is
not fixed or firm dependent but is the result of several factors. In his model, he argues
that if there is a convenient lending contract, as it could be the financing obtained by the
relationship lender, then the firm should borrow everything from this bank. However, we do
observe that firms differentiate their source of funding even in such cases.
Rajan (1992) and Bolton and Freixas (2006) developed models of financial markets and
corporate finance in which different sources of funding coexist in equilibrium. Rajan (1992)
finds that a loan from the relationship lender would give to the bank bargaining power over
firm’s profit once the project has begun. Therefore, the firm optimal choice of funding at-
tempt to circumscribe such power for the banks. Rajan (1992) paper supports the hypothesis
of loan to bond substitution in the idea that changing credit conditions modify the relative
costs between different forms of financing thus requiring a rebalancing of the firm’s debt
structure.
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) also develop a model of choice between bank lending and
publicly traded debt. The intuition of their model is that banks are interested in building up
a reputation for making efficient renegotiation versus liquidation decisions and this provides
them with larger incentive to invest resources in collecting private information from borrowers
with respect to the sparse corporate bond investors. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) proves
that in equilibrium bank loans minimize inefficient liquidation, and will be preferred from
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firms with higher probability of financial distress; more profitable firms will prefer bond
financing. Crisis periods tend to lower the profitability of firms thus making funding more
expensive. Firms in a long-lasting relationship with one or more banks might find convenient
to substitute some of their corporate bond financing with bank financing. The intuition is
that banks, by collecting information about their relationship borrowers over time, are able to
distinguish fundamentals of opaque firms better then external investors. Hence, these banks
might help the relationship borrower in harsh times by lending more funds, and allowing
for the possibility of an efficient renegotiation. Such renegotiation would be precluded or
very difficult to obtain if the firm should deal with dispersed bondholders thus leading to an
inefficient liquidation.
The results in this chapter raise a further research question. My hypothesis is that
in countries experiencing a bank biased financial system the effect of individual lender’s
characteristics could be stronger than the substitution effect documented. I address the
question in chapter III where lenders’ data are interacted with the aggregate borrowing
conditions in the regression equation.
3. Data and Methodology
A. Data
For the analysis in this chapter I collect firm level data from several databases. For the
accounting data of European firms, I use Compustat global. Compustat’s balance sheet
data are available at quarterly frequency and they are used to control for firms’ specific time
varying characteristics in the regression specifications.
To construct the dependent variable I download data on loans and bonds from two
different databases. From Reuters’ Dealscan I obtain detailed firm level data on syndicated
loans whereas data for bonds are downloaded from the Thomson One Banker.
The six macro level lending variables that I use as exogenous regressors to proxy overall
27
credit conditions in the Euro area are the following: 1) Lending standards, 2) Lending growth,
3) Non-performing Loans, 4) Loan allowances, 5) Bank stock returns and 6) Monetary policy.
I collect data for constructing the lending standards, lending growth and monetary pol-
icy variable from the ECB statistical warehouse website. Non-performing loans and loan
allowances are both expressed as fraction of total loans and are computed as averages of big
banks accounting information. Lending standards is a time-series of data obtained from the
ECB lending survey. The value of the variable of interest is the answer to the question that
ECB pose to loan officers of Eurozone banks about whether in the previous quarter they
think their bank credit standards towards firms have been tightened, remained the same
or have been relaxed. The final figure is obtained as the difference between the percentage
of loan officers who declare that lending standards are tighter, and those who declare that
they are looser, in each quarter, compared to the previous one. Any number greater than
zero means that credit standards in the quarter are tighter than credit standards in the
previous quarter; negative numbers indicate an overall relaxation of the lending standards.
The second variable is lending growth which is the growth rate of loans in the euro area
to non-financial corporations as reported by MFIs to the ECB.7 Non-performing loans is
constructed as the average of the top 10 Euopean banks’ non-performing loans over total
loans. This is an accounting-based variable and reflects expected losses on loans granted
from banks. In addition, loan allowances is accounting based and it is the average of the
top 10 European banks allowances for loan losses over total loans. Data for non-performing
loans and loan allowances are collected from Compustat. A higher value for the loan al-
lowances variable means that overall the banking sector is provisioning for a higher amount
of non-performing loans and therefore can indicate a period of stress for the banking sector.
Stock returns is the average of stock returns of the 10 largest banks by volume of loans in
the sample. Finally, the monetary policy variable is constructed as deviations of the interest
rate from the rate implied by the Taylor rule calculated as in Taylor (1993). Since not all
7Data are available on the ECB statistical warehouse website
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the variables needed to compute the Taylor rule are available for the Euro area I used the
methodology presented in Maddaloni and Peydro´ (2011) of using the residual of a regression
of GDP over inflation and interest rate to proxy the deviations from the Taylor rule. A
high value of the monetary policy variable means that the actual rate is farther from the
equilibrium rate implied by the Taylor rule and can be interpreted as the monetary policy
being tight.
For the U.S. benchmark analysis, firms’ accounting data are collected from Compustat
North America while data for the macro lending variables are collected from the Fed of St.
Louis website and from the Call Reports for big banks. For U.S. firms the sample spans the
quarters from 1990:Q2 to 2015:Q2 and includes several crises and economic boom periods.
For Eurozone firms the estimation window goes from 2002:Q1 to 2015:Q2. The reason for
a shorter window is the necessity of collecting broader level macroeconomic data, which in
most cases are available as aggregate data at the Eurozone level only since 2002. Nonetheless,
the short window includes periods of growth as well as period of crisis with significant central
bank’s interventions, and thus provide the necessary variation to perform the analysis.
B. Methodology
As part of the strategy to identify the credit supply effect on the debt structure, I apply
several filters to the sample. Excluding from the sample firm-quarters where neither bonds
nor loans are granted to the firm ensures that observing less loans necessarily means more
bonds are issued which in turn rules out the hypothesis that observing less loans is due to lack
of credit demand rather than a shrinkage in supply. Therefore, firms that are not filtered
out from the sample, and switch from one source of financing to the other, are choosing
according to the relative cost of the two sources of funding. A second filter I applied drops
observations with missing accounting data. The reason to apply this filter is that we need to
include control variables in the regression specification to ensure the conditional exogeneity
of the variable of interest. Of the remaining firm-quarters in the sample I also exclude short
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maturity loans as revolving lines and commercial papers, and to avoid misinterpretation of
the outcomes, financial firms with primary sic code between 6000 and 7000 are also excluded
from the analysis.
In the main specification, the dependent variable is constructed as a ratio of the amount
of loans obtained by a firm in a given quarter over the total combined amount of loans and
bonds raised by the firm in the quarter. The dependent variable defined in this way includes
observations in which firms only issue loans, only issue bonds, and observation in which firms
issue both loans and bonds. When the dependent variable equals zero then only bonds are
issued, when it is equal to one the firm raises only bank loans, while any number between
zero and one is indicating a mix of loan financing and bond financing in a given quarter. This
design also captures partial substitutions when a portion of the amount previously raised
with loans or bonds it is then raised with the other form of debt 8. In each specification of
the regression equation, the dependent variable is regressed on a specific lending variable in
the set of macro-variables described above. Fixed effects at the firm level are also included to
capture the effect of firm specific characteristics that do not change over time. The regression
equation is the following:
LBit = α + µi + βAt + δXit + εi
Where the dependent variable is labelled LBit and is defined as described above. LBit
varies across firms and time. µi captures the firm fixed effects and is imposing a different
intercept for each firm. Using fixed effects at firm level is central for the identification
strategy of the analysis. Indeed the inclusion of fixed effects demean the model, thus the
resulting demeaned dependent variable will always be zero in three occasions. First, a firm
that over the years analysed in the sample only issue bonds, a firm that only raise funding
through bank loans, and a firm that only appears in the sample once. Observations of
8Although the design is not able to capture the degree of partial substitution
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the dependant variable for absolute non-switchers and firms that only appear once have no
predictive power because of the use of firm fixed effect. The design of the empirical model
implies that I can only observe the effectiveness of the channel if firms actually switch from
one form of financing to the other consistently with changes in the independent variables. At
represents the time varying lending variable chosen in each specification from the set of six
possible explanatory lending variables capturing the effect of aggregate lending conditions.
Xit is a set of firms’ control variables that change across firms and time.
A possible weakness of the analysis is that time fixed effects cannot be included in the
regression equation otherwise they would absorb the effect of the lending variable of interest
that only changes over time. Therefore, especially for the monetary policy variable, the
risk arise that the estimated coefficient could be capturing the effect of time that cannot
be controlled for in this specification. The reason why the monetary policy variable should
be particularly affected is related to the fact that changing in the monetary policy stance
is mainly implemented as a response to a crisis. In order to provide more robustness to
the coefficient estimated for the monetary policy variable and more generally to the effect
of aggregate borrowing conditions on the firm’s choice between loan and bond financing, I
introduce an instrumental variable that should remove the possible endogeneity issue. The
instrument is the lagged value of the 3 months euribor futures’ prices, where the price of
the future is quoted as 100 minus the 3-months euribor spot rate. Since there is no reason
to believe that the lagged price of such futures could influence the amounts loaned today if
not through the monetary policy variable and its determinants, I am confident that this is a
suitable instrument for the analysis.
The filters applied ensure that only firms that have been able to borrow from the bond
market relatively recently populate the sample. All of the firms that have not been issuing
bonds in the last 5 years are excluded from the sample in the main specification, meaning
that firms in the sample all have access to the corporate bonds market and will switch their
financing source only according to their relative costs. In the robustness checks of section 5
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the filter on past issuance of bonds is tweaked to check that the estimates obtained do not
crucially depend on the choice of the filter. The coefficients in the robustness section are
consistent with those obtained in the main specification.
In the section dedicated to the investigation on the degree of substitution, I study whether
firms were able to fully substitute their source of funding or they were, at least partially,
credit rationed. To capture the partial substitution effect the empirical design must be
changed to include a different dependent variable. I choose the log of total amount raised in
each quarter as dependent variable. Using LB as dependent variable can only tell us that
there was substitution but not if the substitution has been partial or full. In this section I use
the full sample of European and US firms and I include a dummy called Eurozone to identify
firms in countries belonging to the Eurozone. The variable of interest is the interaction
between Eurozone and the lending variable. The interaction variable tells us how much,
firms in the Eurozone, are able to substitute between the two sources of funding compared
to their U.S. counterpart. The empirical model would be transformed in the following way:
Log amount = α + µi + β0At + β1Eurozonei + β2(Ait ∗ Eurozonei) + δXit + εi
Where Log amount is the dependent variable as described above, At is the lending variable
that proxies aggregate credit conditions, Eurozonei is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
firm belongs to a country in the Eurozone and is 0 otherwise, and Xit is a set of control
variables. Ait ∗Eurozonei is the variable of interest. I also provide alternative estimates by
restricting the sample to a specific set of firms that are more likely to ask funds even during
periods of market turmoil.
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4. Empirical Analysis
In this chapter, I provide evidences on the existence and functioning of the substitution
channel in Europe and on how it works compared to the US one. In particular, I determine
that the direction of the substitution effect is not the one expected from empirical literature,
and I give theoretical explanation on how these supposedly unexpected results have a logic
explanation related to the fact that previous analyses only considered US firms while this
analysis focus on Eurozone firms. Therefore, the different capital market conditions, and
the relative predominance of the banking system over the market, might have generated a
different reaction of firms to changing aggregate borrowing conditions as proxied by the six
alternative lending variables considered.
A. Data Description
Table I contains descriptive statistics of Eurozone firms’ variables. The sample of Euro-
zone firms in this chapter spans years from 2002 to 2015. The reason to use such a relatively
short sample is the lack of data about the macroeconomic lending variables for each single
country before the introduction of the ECB; hence each observation is included in the sample
only if the firm belongs to a country which is already in the monetary union in that quarter.
The starting dataset is a panel of 9,154 non-financial corporations based in the euro
area and repeatedly observed over the time window spanning from 2002 to 2015. The total
number of firm-quarter observations is 54,428. Excluding from the sample all firm-quarter
observations in which no form of credit is issued or the maturity is too short (e.g. bonds
with maturity shorter than one year, revolving lines and other form of short term loans) I
am left with 7,775 firms for a total of 28,196 firm-quarter observations. Of this subsample,
19,088 observations are bank loans with mean size e281 million and median equal to e87.4
million and 9,108 are corporate bonds issued. The mean size of bonds is e783 million and
the median is e375 million. The number of loans is more than double that of the bonds;
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Table I. Descriptive statistics
The table reports descriptive statistics for the sample of Eurozone firms. All the amounts are in millions of
US Dollars unless differently specified in the table. The last two rows refer to the average amount of loans
granted and bonds issued respectively.
Bonds only Loans only Bonds and Loans
Variable (in millions) Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Assets 55,172.84 46,716.45 25,204.73 2,387.75 48,048.19 21,509
Long term debt 8,480.394 6,537.5 7.694.199 409.85 11,025.08 4,724
Plant and Equipment 16,798.96 9,203.2 7,285.234 348.351 17,414 4,524
Leverage% 23% 18% 25% 24% 26% 24%
ROA% 3% 2.4% 3.1% 2.8% 2.9% 2.7%
Market to Book 2,047,475 1,224,674 900,101.3 1,613,030 2,024,219 1,511,495
Loans e281 e87.4
Bonds e783 e375
however, the size of each bonds’ issuance is on average much higher than the size of a bank
loan. I interpret it as the fact that usually bigger firms, who require larger amounts to
finance their assets, are more likely to be able to raise funding in the public debt market
at competitive prices compared to smaller firms. After merging the dataset with accounting
data from Compustat, I am left with 2,406 firm-quarter observations of Eurozone firms; 1,360
of which are loans and 1,046 are bonds.
Table II. Lending Variables Correlation (Eurozone)
This table reports the covariance matrix of of the six lending variable relative to the Eurozone chosen for
the analysis. The variables included are the most related to bank lending in the set of available variables.
The star indicates that the correlation is significantly different from zero.
Loan allowances Lending growth Lending standards NPL’s
Loan allowances 1
Lending growth -0.42 1
Lending standards -0.128 0.3274* 1
NPL’s 0.3624* -0.7881* -0.2244 1
In Table II the correlation matrix for the lending variables shows few unexpected signs.
In principle, I expect the lending growth variable to be negatively correlated with all of the
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other lending variables. Lending growth is indeed negatively correlated to loan allowances
and non-performing loans but it is positively and significantly correlated to the lending
standards as it is shown in Figure 1. This might indicate that the lending standards variable
represents the tightness of the screening that banks perform on new borrowers while they
still grant credit to borrowers they already know.
Figure 1. Lending standards - Lending growth
The figure shows the dynamic overtime of two of the six lending variable considered. Lending standards
(blue line) is an integer representing the number of loan officers that consider the lending standards of their
bank tighter compared to the previous quarter minus the number of those loan officers that considered them
looser and it’s value is reported on the left of the graph. Aggregate lending growth (red line) is reported
on the right of the graph and is a percentage. The variable aggregate lending growth reports the growth in
lending compared to the previous quarter.
For the US sample, there is an average of around 5% of firms that will issue a new loan
and no bonds the year after they issued a loan. The corporate bond market instead is more
stable both in U.S. and in the Eurozone. Therefore, of firms issuing bonds in a given year,
on average 38% will issue a bond also the following year. Switchers behave similarly in
Eurozone and U.S.. In Figures 2 and 3 data for switchers (both from loan to bond and bond
to loan) are plotted for each year. In both regions the majority of firms tend to switch to
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loan in normal times but do the opposite during crises.
Figure 2. Switchers in U.S.
This figure plot the percentage of switchers from bond to loan (green line) and from loan to bond (yellow
line) among U.S. firms in each quarter
Figure 3. Switchers in Eurozone
This figure plot the percentage of switchers from bond to loan (green line) and from loan to bond (yellow
line) among Eurozone firms in each quarter
Looking at descriptive data it is clear that firms tend to be non-switchers; meaning
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that the source of financing for each firm is mostly the same over the years spanned by
the sample both for firms that usually get bank loans and for firms that issue bonds. In
particular, among firms getting a loan in a specific year, on average 13% will obtain another
loan in the following year the persistence is even stronger for regular bond issuer. Among
firms that issue bonds in a given year, on average 29% of them will issue new bonds the
following year. Among switchers, the predominant direction is the switch from bond to loan.
Nevertheless, there are years in which the opposite switch from loan to bond prevails and it
is interesting to notice that those years are characterised by economic policy’s related events
that broadly affected the Eurozone. The first year in which we observe consistent loan to
bond substitution is the 2009. The year 2009 marks the beginning of the Eurozone crisis. In
the early months of 2009, the average lending rate to non-financial corporations was close to
the highest level ever reached since the creation of the Eurozone and -though at a lower rate-
credit standards were still tightening. This combination of factors reduced the cost of issuing
bonds for many firms with access to the public debt market relative to the cost of bank loans.
Over the year 2009, the average lending rate decreased considerably possibly rebalancing the
relative costs of loans and bonds. The second year to consider is the 2012. In year 2012,
the lending rates were stable but the credit standards were again tightening at faster pace.
Tightening credit standards coupled with the intervention of the ECB, which introduced
the Outright Monetary Transaction Programme (OMT), and with the tendency of banks
to hoard liquidity instead of lending out funds, determined another wave of switching from
loan to bonds that we observe in the data. 9 10 Finally we observe 2015 to be a year with
a consistent number of firms switching from loans to bonds (despite for 2015 this number is
not too far higher than the number of firms switching from bond to loan). In 2015 despite
the slowly decreasing average lending rates and the looser credit standards compared to
the previous year, more firms choose bonds over loans when the previous year they chose
9See Acharya, Gale, and Yorulmazer (2011) for references on liquidities holdups
10Interventions by the Eurosystem in public and private debt securities markets in the Euro area to ensure
depth and liquidity in those market segments that are dysfunctional.
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bank loans as source of funding. This is likely to be due by the ECB finally introducing
the expanded asset purchase programme (commonly known as quantitative easing). The
QE works through several transmission channel and allows the ECB to purchase a large
quantity of assets held by non-bank financial institution, in this way the ECB encourages
them to rebalance their portfolios into riskier assets, such as corporate bonds or stocks. This
in turn will make public debt more available and cheaper to firms.
In Table III I report the correlation matrix of the lending variables in US. Also for US we
observe that lending growth is negatively correlated with loan allowances and non-performing
loans; however it is interesting to see that lending standards is not significatively correlated
to lending growth. From the analysis of Table III I can hypothesise that lending standards
are not an important proxy for the credit supply and therefore would not be able to highlight
the substitution effect in the US.
Table III. Lending Variables Correlation (U.S.)
This table reports the covariance matrix of of the six lending variable relative to U.S. firms chosen for the
analysis. The variables included are the most related to bank lending in the set of available variables. The
star indicates that the correlation is significantly different from zero.
Lenidng growth Lending standards NPL’s Loan allowances
Loan allowances 1
Lending growth -0.5201* 1
Lending standards -0.0467 0.0212 1
NPL’s 0.8446* -0.5751* 0.0282 1
B. U.S Extension
Table IV presents a simple extension to Becker and Ivashina (2014) where I introduce
the amounts in the dependent variable. More precisely the dependent variable is the ratio
of the amount of bank loans received for a given firm-quarter - expressed in US Dollars -
over the total amount of bonds issued and loans received in the same firm-quarter. The
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use of amounts allows the inclusion in the sample of firms that receive both bank finance
and market finance in the same quarter and that were excluded in the original specification
for identification problems. The model is estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS), errors
are clustered at quarterly level, and firm-level fixed effects are included. It is immediate to
notice that the number of observations drops from around 11,000 to 7,300 when amounts
are introduced. Panel A of Table IV presents the coefficients obtained by replicating Becker
and Ivashina (2014) regression specification but extending the sample to the first quarter of
2015. The estimation in the extended sample gives coefficients consistent with theoretical
and empirical literature and thus seem to be robust to different time period specification.
All of the lending variables confirm the strong pro-cyclical effect in the debt financing mix
for the firms in the sample. In column (1) the macro-lending variable “lending standards”
is the average of the banks’ loan officers’ opinion on credit standards reported to the FED.
The coefficient should negatively correlate to the availability of bank debt. The coefficient is
indeed negative and significant but the magnitude is much smaller than the one reported in
Panel A of Table IV where the indicator is used as dependent variable. The point estimate
implies that the loan to total amount ratio decreases by only 0.016 percentage points for a
one standard deviation increase in the lending standards. The coefficient in column (1) is
indicating that when lending standards tighten firms switch to bond financing. Nonetheless,
despite the coefficient is positive, it is significant only at 10% level, and the effect on the
dependent variable for a one standard deviation increase is not large in magnitude. The
effect is even lower than the one implied by the coefficient in Panel A. The magnitude and
the significance of the coefficient is not surprising as it was evident also in the previous
empirical literature that the changing credit standards is not a powerful predictor of the
firm willingness to switch from bank loan to bond and vice-versa. The rest of the estimation
is in line with results in the literature with firm-level fixed effects explaining large part of
the variation thus validating the hypothesis of the importance of compositional effects in
the financing decision. The estimated coefficients in column (1) might suggest that these
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effects are even larger than those implied by previous results. The coefficient of the lending
variable is not very significant and is small in magnitude while the coefficient for the log-
asset is relatively big and it is strongly significant. The results shows that probably being
in a certain class of firms with some specific characteristics (e.g. high level of log-assets) is
more relevant than the current level of credit standards for receiving additional bank credit
with respect to periods in which bank’s credit standards are looser. This is also consistent
with Kashyap and Stein (2000), which finds that weaker firms suffer more than others when
banks restraint credit supply.
In the specification in column (2) the explanatory variable of interest is “lending growth”
that is predicted to be positively correlated with the availability of bank financing. The
coefficient is indeed positive and strongly significant. The effect of lending growth is larger
in magnitude than the one reported in Panel A. In column (3) the explanatory variable
of interest is the ratio of non–performing loans to total loans for banks. This measure is
more objective than the previous two as it is obtained from accounting data and not from
opinions surveyed by the FED as it was in the previous two estimation exercises. The
regression coefficient in column (3) predicts a positive and significant effect for the lending
variable of interest (non-performing loans). This column predicts a drop in bank loans of
five percentage points for a one standard deviation increase in the aggregate level of non-
performing loans. The coefficient estimated is consistent with the negative relationship
between non-performing loans and bank lending reported in the theory. In column (4) loan
allowances over total loans is the main explanatory variable. “Loan allowances” is again an
accounting-based variable and reflects expected losses on loans granted from banks. The
coefficient for the regression of loan allowances on bank lending is negative and is strongly
significant. The explanation is that an increase in banks’ loan allowances indicates that banks
expect a larger fraction of loans to be delinquent and implies a drop in bank-supplied credit.
The effect of the loan allowances on the dependent variable is also very strong in magnitude
and it predicts a reduction in loans granted by the bank when the loan allowances increase.
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In column (5), the coefficient is positive and significant. Estimation in column (5) uses the
returns of a bank-stock index that is a measure of banks’ performances as macro variable
of interest. The returns on the bank stock index correlates negatively to the loan to total
amount ratio meaning that a one standard deviation increase in the banks’ performance, as
measured by the index, will increase the amount of finance raised from the bank relatively to
the total combined amount of debt raised from banks and market by 3.1 percentage points.
In the last column, the macro-lending variable is called monetary policy and is a measure
of the deviations of the policy rate from the Taylor rule. The coefficient is confirmed to be
negative and significant meaning that a restrictive monetary policy stance reduces bank debt
availability for firms. Someone may argue about whether the deviations from the Taylor rule
is still a good measure of the monetary policy stance in recent years as the introduction
of unconventional monetary policy complemented the policy rate tool with other powerful
instruments adopted by central banks such as forward guidance and quantitative easing.
Nonetheless, the results for U.S. firms prove to be robust when the sample is split to separate
the years before the introduction of non-conventional monetary policies from years following
the implementation of the first LSAP programme by the FED.
The firm-specific control variables show that bigger firms (in terms of log-asset) are more
likely to receive bank financing than smaller firms. This might seem in contrast with the
findings in the literature that bank loans are more important for weaker firms; however,
there are many reasons to believe that larger firms are more likely to receive credit from
banks than weaker firms. This could be due to the higher share of collateral that bigger
firms can pledge or from the fact that the syndicated loans market is more accessible to big
firms or some other reasons. On the other hand, better performing firms identified as firms
with positive stock returns or firms paying dividends, are more likely to issue bonds in all
the specification considered in Table IV.
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Table IV. U.S. Benchmark
Each observation corresponds to firm-quarters in which new debt is issued (either loans or bonds). The key coefficient of
interest are the coefficients of the lending variables representing aggregate credit conditions. In Panel A Benchmark results
of a regression of the dependent variable Loanit on the lending variable and the firms’ characteristics are reported. Loanit is
defined as an indicator variable which equals 1 if a loan has been issued by a firm in a given quarter and is zero if a bond was
issued in a given quarter. In Panel B the main results for the U.S. subsample are reported. The dependent variable is LBit
which is the ratio of the amount of loans raised by a firm in a given quarter divided the total amount raised by the firm in that
quarter.LBit equals 0 if a firm issue loans only, equals 1 if the firm issues bonds and is a number between 0 and 1 if a firm
issued both forms of finance in a given quarter. All the regression equations are estimated with OLS for the period 1990:Q2 -
2015:Q2 and include firm-fixed effects.
Panel A: Benchmark results
Dependent Variable: Loanit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lending variables Lending standards Lending growth NPL’s Loan allowances bank stock index Monetary policy
Benchmark -0.00106*** 0.317*** -1.857*** -6.211*** 0.0817*** -2.027***
Constant Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 10,670 10,698 9,905 9,905 10,544 10,698
Panel B: U.S. Main specification
Dependent Variable: LBit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lending variables:
Lending standards 0.000687*
(0.000352)
Lending growth 0.401***
(0.0818)
NPL’s -2.459***
(0.384)
Loan allowances -8.037***
(1.033)
Bank stock index 0.108***
(0.0281)
Monetary policy -2.114***
(0.483)
Firm’s characteristics:
Lag log assets 0.0728*** 0.0686*** 0.0834*** 0.0634** 0.0800*** 0.0580**
(0.0270) (0.0257) (0.0272) (0.0277) (0.0267) (0.0267)
Lag log ppe -0.0582** -0.0570** -0.0614** -0.0552** -0.0571** -0.0516*
(0.0266) (0.0259) (0.0274) (0.0277) (0.0270) (0.0265)
ROA -0.152 -0.205 -0.330 -0.296 -0.234 -0.203
(0.291) (0.286) (0.300) (0.297) (0.295) (0.283)
Market to book assets -0.00282 -0.0121 -0.0155 -0.0193 -0.00661 -0.00377
(0.0127) (0.0118) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0127) (0.0126)
Lag return -0.0348** -0.0246* -0.0219 -0.0240 -0.0273* -0.0348**
(0.0141) (0.0146) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0137)
Lag leverage 0.0353 0.0471 0.0724 0.0740 0.0604 0.0375
(0.0664) (0.0661) (0.0657) (0.0658) (0.0639) (0.0659)
Dividend -0.0970*** -0.0982*** -0.0893*** -0.0846*** -0.0777*** -0.0891***
(0.0264) (0.0265) (0.0281) (0.0278) (0.0273) (0.0260)
Constant 0.128 0.158* 0.144 0.365*** -0.161 0.181*
(0.103) (0.0937) (0.0937) (0.0955) (0.109) (0.0984)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 7,297 7,318 6,900 6,900 7,230 7,318
R-squared 0.477 0.480 0.485 0.488 0.479 0.480
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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C. Eurozone firms
In this section I present the results for the sample of Euro area firms. The firms included
in the regression analysis in Table V are from Eurozone countries only. Indeed, including
more European countries outside Eurozone in the sample would have come at the cost
of not having consistent measures for the lending variables. This specification allows to
use data that are mostly collected from the ECB statistical warehouse. Otherwise, we
should have used synthetic measures to build the lending variable. The dependent variable is
once again the loan-to-total-amount ratio. The coefficient of the lending variable in column
(1) of Table V already brings to our attention the different response to changes in credit
standards for (the average) Eurozone firms as opposed to the US case. The point estimate
for the “lending standards” variable has positive sign and it is significant, meaning that
when lending standards are strict we observe a positive change in the dependent variable
compared to periods in which the standards are looser. It is important to notice that
the estimated coefficient has a sign opposite to the one found in the previous subsection.
Tighter credit standards command a switch from loan financing to bond financing for U.S.
firms. Conversely, for Eurozone firms, when the lending standards tighten by one standard
deviation the dependent variable increases by 0.1 percentage points. The result that might
seem counterintuitive in the first place brings up other considerations about the sample
composition and the role of financial market versus the private banks’ credit market in
Europe.
The first consideration concerns the sample selection. One may think that the result
is driven by the fact that having only syndicated loans in the sample implies that only
certain firms with similar characteristics are represented and those firms are likely to be
more collateralized than those not obtaining syndicated loans. Banks -especially in period of
crisis- might want to reallocate the amount previously lent to smaller firms (not included in
the sample) to other firms that were already obtaining bank loans thus not increasing their
costs, and consequently driving the estimate upward (flight to quality). This behaviour from
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banks would push the coefficient in a direction opposite to the one observed in the US case
just because of sample selection. This clearly does not mean that the total amount of debt
increased but simply that the fraction of bank loans in the total new debt is now higher.
The above explanation should not be the reason of the unexpected sign on the coefficient for
lending standards. Comparing averages of firms’ characteristics in the Eurozone and the US
sample I find the differences not statistically significant; hence it is unlikely that this effect
is driving the result, otherwise it should have done so also for US firms.
A second consideration concerns the role of the public debt market. This market in Eu-
rope can be considered underdeveloped when compared to the US counterpart. The financial
system in Europe is more bank-centric. In the U.S. system firms could switch from banks to
the efficient capital market relatively easily, whereas in Europe firms usually rely on relation-
ship lenders as one of the main source of financing (see Bolton, Freixas, Gambacorta, and
Mistrulli (2016)). Relationship lending helps to compensate the inefficiencies of European
capital markets that exclude from public funding firms that should be able to raise funds,
and force firms to turn to bank loans in order to finance their assets. In periods of tighter
credit standards some firms might be perceived as too risky by the few investors present in
the European bond market which will demand too high yields. The choice to start a relation-
ship lending over pursuing a transaction based lending make the relative cost of relationship
lender funds cheaper than the cost of bonds thus mandating a higher percentage of bank
debt in the total stock of funding raised in period of financial distress. Bolton et al. (2016)
suggests that the relationship lender should charge higher rates in boom period because of
higher monitoring costs. However when the crisis hits relationship lender can lend at more
favourable rates to known profitable firms compared to transaction lenders. The positive
coefficient that I find hints at the presence of relationship lending. Relationship lender can
offer lower prices than the capital market to firms that relinquish soft information over the
years. The observed positive coefficient for the lending variable in column (1) means that
during crises (or period of tight credit in general) firms that find the cost of issuing pub-
44
lic debt too high will turn to banks (probably to the relationship lender) to substitute the
amounts they cannot raise any more with bonds. If the theory holds true, the bank should
be able to extract higher rent from the firm, and this is likely to be reflected in the pricing
of future loans. The hypothesis of relationship lending shall be studied in chapter 3.
The signs of the coefficients in columns (2), (3), (4) follow those in the previous section.
This is because the macro lending variables used in these specifications are related to the
overall banking sector health status which clearly does not depend on specific features of the
Eurozone credit market or the strength of relationship lending. In column (2) the coefficient
for lending growth is positive as expected. As the aggregate lending measure for small,
medium, and large firms grows, also the amount of loans grows more than the amount of
bonds issued. In the Eurozone for a one standard deviation drop in aggregate lending, the
amount lent by banks with respect to the total funds raised drops by 2.9 percentage points.
It is worth to notice that the lending variable collected from the ECB includes small and
medium firms as well as big firms, while the sample available for this research is composed
mainly of big firms with access to the syndicated loan market. Therefore, the lending variable
measures the effect of aggregate credit conditions on the availability of bank credit to the
firms in the sample, and it is not just a direct link between credit granted and credit obtained
by big firms. In column (3), the loan allowances lending variable is positively correlated with
the dependent variable meaning that an increase in loan allowances lead to an increase in the
amounts of bond issued with respect to bank loan supply. Column (4) -also keeping with the
expectations- predicts a positive coefficient for the non-performing loans variable. When the
non-performing loans in the European banking system go up, banks are less likely to lend,
and firms tend to switch to bond financing. When non-performing loans increase by one
standard deviation the loans to total amount variable decreases by 5.2 percentage points. In
column (5) the lending variable is the average returns of the 10 largest bank in the sample
in terms of loans. The sign of the coefficient is positive meaning that the better the banks
performs the more they are willing to lend. Nonetheless, it seems that the coefficient is not
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significant indicating that probably this variable does not really affect the supply of credit
of the banks, and in turn the probability of switching to bond financing. Banks’ returns
are probably driven by external factors more than fundamentals. In column (6) the lending
variable is the monetary policy stance. While for the U.S. analysis the data available from
the FED allow to build a variable representing the deviations from the Taylor rule, there
is no available data of potential GDP for the Eurozone. To overcome the issue I adopt the
methodology presented in Maddaloni and Peydro´ (2011) of using the residuals of a regression
of GDP over inflation and interest rate to proxy deviations from the Taylor rule.
The estimation in column (6) returns a positive and significant coefficient. This is sig-
nalling that when the monetary policy stance is loose firms will be likely to switch from bank
financing to bond financing. When the monetary policy tightens by one standard deviation,
the amount of loans over the total amount raised by the firms goes up by 1 percentage point.
With the advent of the financial crisis the expansive monetary policy - consisting in
the injection of extra-liquidity in the financial system - undertaken by the ECB, played a
role in keeping bond yields to low levels for more transparent firms or for those with good
fundamentals. For the above-mentioned firms the policy reduced the cost of issuing bonds
relative to bank borrowing, thus leading these firms to exchange some of the bank financing
with extra bond financing. The evidence of this effect might be seen as evidence of the
effectiveness of the monetary policies operated by the ECB, and the usefulness of the loan
to bond substitution channel in transmitting countercyclical policies to fight crises
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Table V. Main Specification Eurozone
This table reports results for the subsample of Eurozone’s firms. The empirical specification is the same as in Panel B of Table
IV. The key coefficient of interest are the coefficients of the lending variables representing aggregate credit conditions and the
dependent variable is LBit which is the ratio of the amount of loans raised by a firm in a given quarter divided the total amount
raised by the firm in that quarter.LBit equals 0 if a firm issue loans only, equals 1 if the firm issues bonds and is a number
between 0 and 1 if a firm issued both forms of finance in a given quarter. All the regression equations are estimated with OLS
for the period 2002:Q1 - 2015:Q2 and include firm-fixed effects.
Dependent Variable: LBit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lending variables:
Lending standards 0.00498***
(0.000797)
Lending growth 0.0508***
(0.0145)
NPL’s -0.0880**
(0.0408)
Loan allowances -0.224***
(0.0725)
Bank stock index 0.087
(0.079)
Monetary policy 0.0619***
(0.0145)
Firm’s characteristics
Lag log assets 0.133 0.281** 0.265** 0.257** 0.128 0.256**
(0.105) (0.107) (0.121) (0.119) (0.106) (0.108)
Lag log ppe -0.0176 -0.0271 -0.0244 -0.0296 -0.00279 -0.0227
(0.0434) (0.0443) (0.0436) (0.0441) (0.044) (0.0434)
ROA 0.224 0.766 0.781 0.725 0.587 0.595
(1.116) (1.119) (1.093) (1.098) (1.061) (1.139)
Market to book assets 7.46E-08 5.85E-08 8.05E-08 6.79E-08 8.15E-08 5.22E-08
(6.31E-08) (7.07E-08) (6.85E-08) (6.76E-08) (6.61E-08) (6.94E-08)
Lag return -0.00835 -0.0406* -0.0382 -0.0272 -0.0289 -0.0368
(0.0232) (0.0226) (0.023) (0.021) (0.0225) (0.0228)
Lag leverage -0.0237 0.0252 0.0121 0.0466 -0.037 -0.084
(0.384) (0.315) (0.322) (0.312) (0.316) (0.317)
Dividend -0.00815 -0.0246 -0.0142 -0.0464 -0.00104 -0.0252
(0.0304) (0.0351) (0.035) (0.0341) (0.0366) (0.0353)
Constant -0.996 -2.380** -2.590** -2.961** -1.038 -2.059**
(1.002) (0.984) (1.2) (1.246) (0.974) (0.99)
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 704 711 711 711 711 683
R-squared 0.469 0.455 0.447 0.454 0.441 0.462
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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D. Instrumental Variable
As mentioned in the previous subsection, the unexpected coefficient in the regression
specification including monetary policy as main explanatory variable may lead someone to
argue that there is endogeneity in the model and that this endogeneity is possibly generated
by a third variable omitted from the empirical model. I argue that the coefficient is pointing
in the right direction, and the sign is consistent with the objective of expansive central bank
monetary policies. In order to provide support to the hypothesis, in this section I introduce
an instrumental variable that addresses possible endogeneity problems related to the use of
the deviations from the Taylor rule as explanatory variable. The candidate instrument is
the lagged price of the 3 months euribor futures. The panel format of the data allows to
use the lagged value of the instrument as a second candidate instrument, the overidentified
model can then be tested using the Hansen-J overidentification test under the null of having
at least one of the instrument not correlated with the residuals of the main regression.
Clearly, the exclusion restriction should be evaluated also from a theoretical point of view.
I believe that it is fair to assume that the lagged price of the 3 months euribor futures
does not affect the supply of credit today if not through the interest rate today. I use
the two candidate variables to instrument the monetary policy variable in an overidentified
instrumental variable regression analysis. The model is estimated with both two stage least
squares estimator (2SLS) and two step efficient GMM (GMM).
The results of the instrumental variable estimations using 2SLS and GMM are reported in
Panel B of Table VI. To provide additional robustness to the instrumental variable estimation
in columns (3) and (4) the same regressions as in columns (1) and (2) are performed using
different lags of the original instrument. To check whether the instrument is appropriate, in
Panel A I report the summary results from the first stage regressions and for the Hansen-J
overidentification test. According to the F-statistic of the first stage the instruments chosen
are relevant in explaining the instrumented monetary policy variable for all the specification
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presented. The Hansen-J test of overidentification results in a p-value of 0.3377 for the
first set of instruments and 0.4180 for the second set of instruments. Both statistics are far
from the critical values thus I do not reject the null hypothesis of the test. The outcome
of the overidentification test supports the instrument validity hypothesis. The coefficient
for the monetary policy variable in Panel B is again positive and significant at 1% level in
both columns, and the magnitudes are very close to each other indicating the robustness of
the result. From the point estimate in column (1) and column(2) a one standard deviation
decrease in the monetary policy variable results in a 1 percentage point decrease in the loan
to total amount variable. The result is replicating the one obtained in the previous section
for the monetary policy variable indicating that an expansive monetary policy allowed some
firms to switch from bank financing to bond financing. In columns (3) and (4) I use two
additional lags to the price of euribor futures to rule out the possibility that also the results
in Table VI are driven by time related factors that affect the amount of loans directly. The
point estimates in columns (3) and (4) indicates that the substitution from bonds to loans
when the level of the monetary policy variable is high, could be more pronounced than
expected. According to the coefficients in columns (3) and (4) a one standard deviation
increase in the monetary policy variable results approximately in a 1.2 percentage point
increase in loans
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Table VI. Instrumental Variable
This table reports results for the instrumental variable (IV) regression. The instruments are the price of euribor futures
contracts taken at different lags and the potentially endogenous regressor is the monetary policy variable. The dependent
variable is LBit which is the ratio of the amount of loans raised by a firm in a given quarter divided by the total amount raised
by the firm in that quarter.LBit equals 0 if a firm issue loans only, equals 1 if the firm issues bonds and is a number between
0 and 1 if a firm issued both forms of finance in a given quarter. In both panels columns (1) and (2) refer to the specification
in which the excluded instruments are the first and the second lag of the price of euribor future whilst in columns (3) and (4)
the excluded instruments are the third and fourth lag of the price of euribor futures. In Panel A test statistics of the first stage
regression and the Hansen-J test are reported for all the specification. Panel B presents results of the IV regressions using both
2SLS and GMM methodologies.
Panel A: Summary results for first-stage regressions
Specification: (1) - (2) (3) - (4)
Weak identification test (H0: Instrument is weak): F( 2, 522) P-val F( 2, 513) P-val
Monetary policy 4023.33 0.000 271.87 0.000
Hansen J statistic (H0: Overidentification restrictions are valid): Chi-sq(1) P-val Chi-sq(1) P-val
0.919 0.3377 0.656 0.4180
Panel B: Instrumental variable regression
Dependent Variable: LBit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lending variable:
Monetary policy 0.0621*** 0.0621*** 0.0792*** 0.0783***
(0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0183) (0.0183)
Firm’s characteristics
Lag log assets 0.257** 0.252** 0.280** 0.272**
(0.105) (0.105) (0.110) (0.110)
Lag log ppe -0.0208 -0.0198 -0.0247 -0.0259
(0.0411) (0.0411) (0.0419) (0.0418)
ROA 0.823 0.927 0.873 0.795
(1.182) (1.177) (1.189) (1.186)
Market to book assets 4.81e-08 4.07e-08 4.14e-08 4.23e-08
(6.93e-08) (6.88e-08) (7.04e-08) (7.04e-08)
Lag returns -0.0374* -0.0350* -0.0365* -0.0382*
(0.0208) (0.0207) (0.0212) (0.0211)
Lag leverage 0.0741 0.0672 0.111 0.124
(0.422) (0.422) (0.426) (0.426)
Dividend -0.0235 -0.0223 -0.0271 -0.0294
(0.0335) (0.0335) (0.0340) (0.0339)
Estimation method 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM
Firm FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 631 631 620 620
R-squared 0.045 0.045 0.041 0.041
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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E. Partial substitution
In this section I investigate the degree of substitution between loans and bonds both in
US and Europe. In previous sections I document the presence of the substitution channel in
both U.S. and Eurozone credit markets. Nonetheless the specification used does not allow to
say anything on the degree of substitution. Indeed firms might have been able to substitute
their bank loans with bond financing but not in full, meaning that the total amount of debt
raised is lower due to an overall liquidity shortage in the credit market which restricts the
supply.
In Table VII and Table VIII I check for the degree of substitutability between loans and
bonds by regressing the logarithm of the total amount raised in a firm-quarter against a
lending variable, some control variables, and an interaction of the lending variable with the
eurozone dummy to discriminate whether the outcome of the partial substitution analysis
differs for firms based in the U.S. and those in the Eurozone. All the regression equations
are estimated using OLS with errors clustered at quarterly level. Firm’s level fixed effects
and time fixed effects are also included in all the specifications.
Table VII presents results for the partial substitution analysis relative to the popoulation
of firms retained in the sample after applying baseline filters. In order to provide a more
robust analysis of the partial substitution effect in Panels A and Panel B of Table VIII I filter
the sample to include only firms which supposedly have more stable demand for funding as
they are less affected by the business cycle, and have longer investment project horizons.
In Panel A I filter out from the sample firms whose average deviation from the median
amount of assets is above the average deviation for the median firm. In this way I should
be able to keep in the sample only firms that do not scale down their assets’ size when
credit conditions deteriorates, and therefore have a constant demand of credit to finance
their assets. With the same logic in Panel B I filter the sample by industry according to
firms’ SIC code. In this specification I include only firms with SIC code between 4000 and
4999 which includes firms in the telecommunications, utilities and health industry. In every
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panel, each column refers to one of the six lending variables I described in the Data section.
Table VII. Partial Substitution 1/2
This table reports results of the partial substitution analysis performed using the baseline sample of firms .
The key coefficients of interest are those associated to the interaction variable. In each column the interaction
is the product of the aggregate lending variable considered with the eurozone dummy. The dependent variable
Log amount is the logarithm of the total amount of credit raised by a firm in a given quarter expressed in
US Dollars. All the regression equations are estimated with OLS for the whole sample period and include
both firm-fixed effects and quarterly calendar effects.
Dependent Variable: Log amount
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lending variables:
(EZ*Lending Variable) -0.00112 0.0843* -24.93* -17.65** 0.472 0.0207
(0.00511) (0.0502) (12.69) (8.064) (0.663) (0.0853)
Lending standards -0.00577*
(0.00295)
Lending growth -0.00433
(0.00921)
NPL’s 3.093
(3.742)
Loan allowances 8.731
(8.309)
Returns -0.726***
(0.247)
Monetary policy 0.0820*
(0.0426)
Control Variables Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 8,416 8,444 7,806 7,803 8,004 8,422
R-squared 0.680 0.676 0.674 0.675 0.679 0.676
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
The coefficients of interest in Table VII are those associated to the interaction variable,
and they are overall pointing in the direction of partial substitution with few exceptions.
The figures in columns (2), (3), and (4) document weak evidence of partial substitution
in Europe as is shown by the coefficient of the interaction variable. In column (2) the
coefficient of the interaction variable between lending growth and the eurozone dummy is
positive and significant at 10% level indicating that when lending growth declines, also
the total amount raised from firms in Eurozone declines compared to the amounts raised
from firms based outside the Eurozone. Looking at column (2) in the next two panels of
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Table VII, the coefficient of the interaction variable rise in magnitude and in significance
providing support to the hypothesis of partial substitution. Results in columns (3) and (4)
point in the same direction of those reported in column (2). The coefficients estimated in
both columns are negative and significant indicating that firms in the Eurozone were only
partially substituting loans with bonds when non-performing loans, and loan allowances were
high. Figures in Panels A and B of Table VIII confirm the results. The coefficients of the
interaction variables in columns (3) and (4) of Panel A and Panel B are negative and strongly
significant thus providing a robust evidence of imperfect substitutability, meaning that the
degree of substitutability between sources of funding for firms in Europe has been revealed
to be lower compared to that of U.S. firms.
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Table VIII. Partial Substitution 2/2
This table reports results of the partial substitution analysis performed on specific subsamples. Panel A
includes only firms whose assets do not deviate consistently from the median assets. In Panel B the filter
exclude all the firms operating in industries with SIC codes not included between 4000 and 4999. The
key coefficients of interest in both panels are those associated to the interaction variable. In each column
the interaction is the product of the aggregate lending variable considered with the eurozone dummy. The
dependent variable Log amount is the logarithm of the total amount of credit raised by a firm in a given
quarter expressed in US Dollars. All the regression equations are estimated with OLS for the whole sample
period and include both firm-fixed effects and quarterly calendar effects.
Panel A: by Deviations from Median
Dependent Variable: Log amount
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lending variables:
(EZ*Lending Variable) 0.00162 0.104* -24.81* -21.88*** 1.010 0.0690
(0.00459) (0.0544) (14.88) (8.223) (0.881) (0.0848)
Lending standards -0.00416
(0.00335)
Lending growth 0.000988
(0.0141)
NPL’s 6.172
(4.156)
Loan allowances 15.90
(9.935)
Returns -1.026***
(0.308)
Monetary policy 0.0917
(0.0605)
Control Variables Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 4,044 4,069 3,714 3,714 3,773 4,054
R-squared 0.747 0.742 0.743 0.743 0.751 0.742
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Panel B: by Industry
Dependent Variable: Log amount
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lending variables:
(EZ*Lending Variable) 0.00582 0.182** -57.85*** -44.28*** 0.409 0.117
(0.00701) (0.0914) (21.76) (14.94) (0.829) (0.142)
Lending standards -0.00791**
(0.00373)
Lending growth 0.0133
(0.0124)
NPL’s 7.234
(9.074)
Loan allowances 19.19
(21.11)
Returns -1.136***
(0.378)
Monetary policy 0.159**
(0.0614)
Control Variables Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,885 1,894 1,718 1,718 1,768 1,893
R-squared 0.716 0.715 0.719 0.720 0.724 0.712
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
5. Robustness
In section 4 I provided evidences on the existence and the direction of the loan to bond
switching channel, and on the degree of substitutability between loans and bonds. In this
section I perform a robustness analysis to support the main findings of the chapter. In the
robustness analysis I consider the response of different subsamples constructed from firms’
individual characteristics to changes in aggregate borrowing conditions.
In Table IX I split the sample by firm leverage and by firms’ total assets. As already
mentioned, literature provides us with evidences that firms with certain characteristics suffer
more when bank supply is weak. 11 To examine this possibility I repeat the empirical
exercise for the bottom and the top quartiles of the observed leverage and total assets
distributions. From the analysis of the coefficients obtained I conclude that a change in
the lending variables affects differently firms with opposite characteristics. The coefficients
11See Domac and Ferri (1999)
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for firms in the bottom quartile of the total assets distribution indicates that small enough
firms appear to be constrained and not able to use the switching channel documented in any
direction. Conversely, firms in the top quartile will switch their source of funding between
loan and bond as documented from the findings in Table IX.
Table IX. Robustness 1/2
Table IX uses the same specification of Table V but for different subsamples of Eurozone’s firms. Each coefficient reported is
the result of an OLS regression which includes firm-fixed effects, and controls for firms’ characteristics. The dependent variable
is the ratio of loan amount over total amount raised in a given quarter by a firm (LBit).The estimation period is 2002:Q1 -
2015:Q2, all errors are clustered by quarter.
Dependent Variable: LBit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lending variables: Lending standards Lending growth NPL’s Loan allowances Returns Monetary policy
Bottom quartile:
Leverage 0.00343** 0.0836*** 0.167** - -0.289** -0.174 0.0883***
(0.00153) (0.0252) (0.0702) (0.110) (0.118) (0.0267)
Asset 0.00320 0.0649 -0.121 -0.354 0.187 0.0744
(0.00319) (0.0507) (0.124) (0.265) (0.556) (0.0497)
Top quartile:
Leverage 0.00496*** 0.0446* -0.0916 -0.260** 0.141 0.0634**
(0.00166) (0.0222) (0.0595) (0.108) (0.103) (0.0252)
Asset 0.00550*** 0.0548** -0.0948* -0.199* 0.185*** 0.0716***
(0.00136) (0.0203) (0.0562) (0.102) (0.0345) (0.0229)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The story is different when I look at leverage. In the bottom quartile firms with low
leverage are supposed to have a more flexible capital structure and therefore -as expected- the
coefficients of the lending variables is significant (despite only at 5% for loan allowances and
non-performing loans) and with the same sign found in the main specification. Nonetheless,
also highly leveraged firms in the top quartile seem to be able to switch from loan to bond
if needed. The effect is significant and points in the same direction for firms in the bottom
quartile as well as for firms in the top quartile. This evidence, in keeping with theoretical and
empirical literature in Bolton et al. (2016), could support the hypothesis that lender’s specific
characteristics are also relevant when firms choose their debt structure. The idea is that solid
lenders or relationship lenders are willing to lend additional funds to their borrowers -even
when already highly leveraged- if they consider the firm capable of producing enough income
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in the future to repay existing debt.
Relax conditioning filters In the baseline results, the sample used to estimate the em-
pirical model is conditioned to include only firms that issued bonds in the previous 5 years.
It is reasonable to believe that firms not filtered out from the sample are those that have
access to the public debt market. Nevertheless, applying the filter does not necessarily drop
firms without access to the bond market with absolute certainty. In order to provide further
evidence of robustness, in Table X I tweak the filter on past issuance to check whether the
results are driven from the choice of the filter and that different filters will return significantly
different point estimates.
The alternatives to the 5 years filter I use are the following: 1) 4 years filter that includes
all firms that issued bonds in the previous 4 years, 2) 2 years filter that includes firms issuing
bonds in the previous 2 years, and 3) the complete removal of the bonds’ conditioning filter.
The first two filters are more restrictive than the original one. A narrow filter makes
harder to argue that firms in the sample do not have access to the corporate bonds market.
A robust estimate obtained using narrower filters should rule out the possibility that the
estimates are driven by the absence of public debt market access rather then being the
outcome of independent firm’s decision of switching between bond and loans financing. The
third alternative removes the filter altogether. Removing the filter should have an ambiguous
effect on the coefficient estimates. Absent the filter, we are including in the sample switcher
firms that for some reason did not issue any bond in the last 5 years (it is possible since bonds
usually have long maturities) but do have access to the market. The inclusion of these firms
in the estimation sample should make the magnitude of the coefficients estimated larger.
On the other hand, without the filter, also non-switcher that do not have market access at
all are included in the sample thus biasing the estimate downward. The last group of firms
should ideally be excluded from the analysis as they are not identifying the effect studied.
The rationale for filtering only for past bond issuance and not for loans as well is that all
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firms that have access to the public debt market should have access to bank debt as well.
From Table X the point estimates obtained by applying the three alternative filters to
the data are strongly significant (except for the lending variable “returns”), have the same
sign of the benchmark coefficients, and are very close in magnitude in most cases. In the
last row of Table X the estimation is performed on the sample that is not filtered for past
bond issuance. The coefficients are slightly lower in magnitude with the exception of the
coefficient estimated for the non-performing loans variable that is sensibly lower.
Table X. Robustness 2/2
Table X reports the coefficients of the lending variables estimated using different filters. The first row reports the baseline
results of Table V obtained using the standard filter that excludes observation for firms that did not issue bonds in the previous 5
years. The dependent variable is LBit, each column corresponds to a specification in which the lending variable is alternatively:
1) Lending standards, 2) Lending growth, 3)Non-performing loans, 4) Loan allowances, 5) Average returns and 6) Monetary
policy. Each coefficient reported is the result of an OLS regression which includes firm-fixed effects and controls for firms’
characteristics. The dependent variable is the ratio of loan amount over total amount raised in a given quarter by a firm
(LBit).The estimation period is 2002:Q1 - 2015:Q2, all errors are clustered by quarter.
Dependent Variable: LBit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lending variables: Lending standards Lending growth NPL’s Loan allowances Returns Monetary policy
Baseline 0.00498*** 0.0508*** -0.0880** -0.224*** 0.0870 0.0619***
4 Years filter 0.00483*** 0.0499*** -0.0868** -0.220*** 0.0889 0.0603***
2 Years filter 0.00450*** 0.0520*** -0.0902** -0.197*** 0.111 0.0579***
No filter 0.00434*** 0.0448*** -0.103*** -0.216*** 0.0306 0.0512***
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Given the evidences provided in the main regression on how firms with market access
consistently switch between loans and bonds in order to adjust to the changing relative cost
debt when banks’ non-performing loans are high; I hypothesize that non-switcher firms that
despite currently lacking debt market access issued bonds sometimes in the past, are still
borrowing from banks. 12
If the hypothesis on the relationship lending holds true it is possible that a firm despite
losing market access will not be credit rationed from the banking sector because it will
substitute transaction loans with relationship loans, and therefore it will not be removed
12Non switcher firms cannot be excluded from the sample when the filter is removed
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from the sample. The presence of these firms in the sample should bias the coefficient
estimate towards zero and this is exactly what is observed in column (3) of Table X.
6. Discussion
The most recent crisis that severely affected the U.S. economy and then spread to Europe
has called a lot of attention from researchers. The literature produced about the crisis is
extensive and touch many fields of economics providing many different points of view. A
large part of the literature has been dedicated to the credit cycle and its interaction with
the business cycle. Theoretical literature finds that changes in credit supply is an important
factor in explaining the credit cycle. Empirical analysis has tried to reconcile theory with
the data. Recently Becker and Ivashina (2014) tried to expand the scope of the empirical
analysis to provide out of sample forecastability which in the previous literature was low or
totally absent. Nonetheless, the limitation of Becker and Ivashina (2014) still resides in the
external validity. The paper only focus on U.S. firms which face different market conditions
with respect to their European counterpart. In addition, the interaction with banks tends
to follow different dynamics in U.S. and in Europe. In the Eurozone the ECB intervened to
make the liquidity readily available to banks. The additional liquidity provided however was
not lent out by banks who preferred to hoard it as a buffer in case of future crises.
This analysis fill the gap in the empirical literature by providing evidences on how the
change in credit supply has affected Euro area firms’ financing decisions. The analysis relates
the changes in credit conditions with the choice of the firm of using either term loans or
issuing corporate bonds to fund their investments. The two options can be considered close
substitutes for large enough firm -especially when considering the syndicated loan market-
thus the choice of switching from one source to the other must be the by-product of a change
in the relative cost of the two financing instruments.
The first interesting descriptive result to notice is that many firms tend not to switch
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their source of financing (that could be either a bank loan or a corporate bond issuance), and
especially those firms who usually issue bonds continue to do so. This behaviour indicates
that despite the lower efficiency of the European capital markets compared to the US one,
firms that gain the access of the corporate bond market usually do not pull out easily thus
making the bond market fairly stable. In contrast, the loan market is very volatile hence
providing the bigger variation to the change in relative price.
The identification strategy in this chapter allows to untangle the demand and supply of
credit that is fundamental in the analysis. Large part of the sample available is characterized
by a crisis. Crises are period in which not only supply of credit fall but usually the lack of
investment opportunities lowers the demand of credit as well. By including in the sample
only firms that get some form of credit (either a term loan or a bond) in each quarter, I make
sure that by observing a lower amount of loans I am not capturing a drop in the demand for
funds of the firms but just a change in relative cost of credit obtained from banks and from
the corporate bond market.
In this chapter I find evidence that poor conditions in the banking sector negatively
affects the supply of loans, and provides ground to advocate for the importance of the
substitution channel in relaxing the adverse effects of a downturn. In this analysis I find
that for variables less related to the actual “health” of the banking sector and more related to
the mechanism underlying the choice of granting loans to firms (e.g. the measure of lending
standards and the monetary policy stance), the substitution channel might work differently
in Eurozone compared to the U.S.. Periods of tight lending standards are not necessarily
related to a reduction in credit supply but could be the outcome of a different allocation of
funds among bank borrowers. In particular, banks with well-established relationships with
borrowers might prefer -in crisis periods- to reallocate their loans towards firms they know
better, and offering relatively cheaper rates compared to transaction based lending. The
design and the firm level dataset of the analysis exclude possible alternative explanations for
what is observed.
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One of the most recurrent endogeneity problem that might affect the analysis of the credit
cycle is the existence of compositional effects that could bias the result. The introduction of
firm level fixed effects ensure that these firm specific compositional effects are controlled for
as long as they are not time varying. The set of firm-specific variables, controls for firm’s
time varying characteristics that capture the same compositional effects.
In this chapter, by isolating the credit supply, I am able to single out the loan to bond
substitution channel for Euro area firms and to uncover some of the factors related to its
functioning. Moreover, I document the existence of a different degree of substitutability be-
tween loans and bonds for Eurozone firms compared to U.S. firms. The lower substitutability
observed in Europe does not allow some firms to raise the desired amount from the credit
market, therefore making the recovery from recession much slower than it could have been
with perfect substitutability. This work provides insights on the relevance of an efficient
public debt market to reduce the adverse effect of a crisis. In particular, how firms which
are profitable, and have investment opportunities available, –thus a positive credit demand-
should be able to get funding even when the banks reduce the supply. Nonetheless, further
analysis is needed to validate the hypothesis put forward in this chapter that lender’s char-
acteristics - and especially the existence of relationship lenders - affect the choice of the debt
structure.
61
62
III. Lender’s Characteristics and Relationship
Lending for Unconstrained Firms
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1. Introduction
The analysis in the previous chapter aims to answer the question about the existence
and the functioning of the loan to bond substitution channel in the Eurozone. Nonetheless,
further investigation is required to shed light on the causal effect that other external factors
might have on the direction of the substitution. I believe that the way the substitution
channel works depends endogenously from the structure of the financial system that is not
harmonized across countries. In this chapter I focus on how the different role that the
banking industry acquired within the financial system and across countries, might influence
the way firms choose their liability structure. More specifically, the empirical analysis in this
chapter tests two different but related hypothesis.
The first hypothesis to test relates the firm’s choice between bank loans and bonds not
only to aggregate credit conditions but also to individual characteristics of informed lenders.
In other words I test whether the health status (intended as the financial soundness) of a
firm’s main lender does affect its financing choice by exacerbating the adverse effect of credit
supply shrinkage during economic downturns or, on the opposite, how it can reduce these
negative effects when lender’s financial fundamentals are particularly strong. In this chapter
the main lender identifies -as in Sufi (2007)- a bank that is the lead arranger of a syndicated
loan, and thus is considered informed relative to the rest of the banks.
The second hypothesis to test is the relationship lending hypothesis. In the subsection
dedicated to relationship lending I test whether this could be assumed a determinant of the
firms’ strong bank bias when choosing the capital structure.
Here I would like to stress out the importance of banks and financial intermediaries
as central for the real economy. Banks provide loans to firms and households but they
also screen and monitor the borrowers. These latter characteristics allow banks to collect
information that are not publicly available and thus not factored in the investment decision
of corporate bond market participants. The screening and monitoring activity that banks
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perform is costly, and these costs are reflected in the price of the loan. Firms choose their
financing mix such that they can keep the advantage of easier renegotiation that banks
concede compared to the probability of renegotiating debt with a pool of sparse investors
but at the same time they try to circumscribe bank’s ability to appropriate rents.13 Among
banks, a firm can choose if they should seek to build a long-term relationship or to engage in
simple transaction lending. Firms will choose an optimal combination between the cheaper
transaction lending and the more expensive relationship lending according to the additional
benefit that they can obtain by establishing a relationship with a bank.
This chapter contributes to the literature on the credit cycle by providing new evidences
on how individual lender characteristics affect firms’ choice of funding when aggregate credit
condition deteriorates. In the empirical section, I test two types of lender characteristics.
The former characteristic I test is the health status of the lender measured by the combined
Tier1-Tier2 risk adjusted capital ratio. I also provide estimates for the more restrictive Tier1
capital ratio and for the level of bank’s loan allowances in the robustness section. In the
second part of the empirical analysis, I test the differential effect on the demand for bank
funds that firms experience when writing a loan contract with a relationship bank rather
than a transaction bank. The second part of the chapter can be intended as an empirical
test of the predictions in Bolton and Freixas (2006) which considers the firms’ optimal choice
of financing between corporate bonds and relationship loans.
From the investigation reported in this chapter, I find new evidences on the relevance of
individual bank characteristics in the choice of firms’ debt structure. The analysis finds that
borrowing frequently from the same lender will have effect on the debt structure of firms
when aggregate credit conditions are poor. In other words, borrowing from a financially
troubled bank will exacerbate the adverse effect of a reduction in credit supply, and make
the use of the substitution channel even more necessary for associated firms. On the opposite,
firms entertaining a long lasting relationship with a safe bank will resort less to the bond
13See Rajan (1992)
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market as they are often able to obtain additional credit from their main lender without
paying disproportionately high fees or interest rates.
In the second half of the chapter, I find that when the habitual lender of a firm is a
relationship lender the firm will not switch to the bond market as much as expected; instead
it resorts to additional relationship funds which are available also in recession periods for
firms with positive NPV investment projects. It is interesting to notice how this second
hypothesis is a more restrictive specification of the first one. In fact, relationship lenders are
often associated to higher capital ratio, as they need to maintain a higher capital buffer to
roll over the debt of illiquid but profitable firms during crises. Nonetheless, given that the
analysis on the relationship lender does not require lenders’ accounting data, we will have a
larger sample when testing the second hypothesis.
This chapter proceeds as follows: in Section 2 I review the related literature, Section 3
describes the data and the methodology, in Section 4 I report the results of the empirical in-
vestigation while Section 5 is dedicated to the robustness checks. Finally, section 6 concludes
the chapter.
2. Literature review
Literature on the influence of lenders’ characteristics on the credit cycle has largely
developed in the 90s. Hancock and Wilcox (1998) present evidences on the link between
bank size, bank credit, and the business cycle. The paper analyses the response of real
activity in small firms to a shock in bank capital. They show that small banks reduce their
loans considerably more than large banks as a response to a negative shock on bank’s capital.
The decline in loans of small banks is related to a greater reduction in economic activity
especially for small firms that are more likely to be credit rationed.
Also Sufi (2007) studies how specific lender characteristics influence bank lending. In his
paper, he focus on information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders in the syndicated
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loan market. Sufi (2007) finds that information asymmetry influences the syndicate structure
and its composition. In particular, he finds that when information asymmetry between
the borrower and lenders is severe, participant lenders are closer to the borrower, both
geographically, and in terms of previous lending relationships. The informed lead bank and
the borrower reputation mitigate information asymmetry problems.
Relationship lending is one of the most investigated feature of the banking system. The
literature on relationship banking can be separated in two waves.
The first wave of models is well represented by Sharpe (1990) and describes relationship
lending as a contract between firms and banks in which a bank acquires information about
the borrower in an early stage and then will exploit those information in a later stage to
extract monopoly rents. The first wave aims to find evidences that firms with a closer bank
relationship are able to raise more funds than firms using arm’s length bank finance.14. These
models provide a description of the relationship lending between banks and firms but they
do not introduce trade-offs that might arise when the firm has a choice between relationship
lending and transaction lending.
In the second wave of models the interest shifted from the analysis of the effects of
relationship lending on firms’ ability of raising funds to the estimation of the value of this
form of lending compared to arm’s length loans. The analyses focus on the insurance,
monitoring, and screening abilities of relationship bank. These banks can provide insurance
on future access to credit for firms (Berger and Udell (1995); Berlin and Mester (1999)),
they can reduce the agency problem through monitoring (Holmstrom and Tirole (1997),
Boot and Thakor (2000)), they can more efficiently screen loan applicants thanks to their
superior information, and can offer continuation lending specifically tailored for each specific
firm.
The rationale for the second wave of papers is that given the cyclicality of bank credit
supply, there is not much reason to borrow from a relationship lender in periods of economic
14See Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995)
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boom when the credit is in high supply. The cost of collecting additional information for the
relationship bank is reflected in higher prices in periods of economic growth; therefore, it is
interesting to study whether the closer bank-borrower relationship is of particular importance
in periods characterized by financial system disruption or by an aggregate shock to the firms’
industry. The idea is that in periods characterized by financial instability, in which firms’
profits are falling independently of their quality, we should observe banks to cut lending to
all firms proportionately except for firms with whom they have long-standing relationships.
The question is interesting as relationship banking is a common practice and it involves both
advantages and costs for a firm to set up such a link.
Many authors provide theoretical models and empirical evidences to corroborate the hy-
pothesis of relationship lending raised in this thesis. Bolton et al. (2016) create a model of
relationship lending against transaction lending and show that relationship lenders, because
of the soft information collection, incur in higher costs and thus charge higher lending rates in
normal times relative to transaction lending which is based exclusively on hard information
and collaterals. Nonetheless, the information collected overtime allows the relationship bank
to continue lending to profitable firms when crises hit. Bolton et al. (2016) provides empirical
evidences employing data from the Italian credit registry to show that relationship lending
increases the resilience of the economy during crises, and showing that Italian banks contin-
ued to lend to their relationship borrower even after the 2008 Lehman Brothers bankruptcy.
In the paper a firm-bank link is defined as “relationship” if the bank headquarter (or branch)
and the firm headquarter are located in the same province.
In the same spirit of Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), Beck, Degryse, De Haas, and
Van Horen (2014) study how transaction lending affects firms’ funding over the business
cycle compared to relationship lending . They use data from the EBRD Banking Environ-
ment and Performance Survey (BEPS) and merge this information with firm-level survey
information and with data on the geographic location of bank branches across 21 countries
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in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus.15 The dataset available to Beck et al. (2014) allows the
identification of the differential effect that relationship lending has over transaction lending
on firms’ financing across the business cycle.
The presence of relationship lending give credit to the case for bailing out banks during
crises as documented by Diamond and Rajan (2005). During a downturn many firms with
good quality projects will eventually shut down in absence of relationship lending due to the
financial constraints that arise.16 In fact, banks tend to shift their credit supply towards
safer (usually bigger) firms. This “flight to quality” has been documented by Domac¸ and
Ferri (1999) who provides evidences of this shift in loan funds recipients from smaller riskier
firms to bigger and safer ones during the Asian crisis.
3. Data and Methodology
A. Data
Following the previous chapter, I use firm level data aggregated at quarterly frequency.
Observations with missing accounting data are excluded, leaving in the sample only firm-
quarters with valid accounting data for both U.S. and Eurozone firms. The accounting
variables are collected from Compustat North America for U.S. firms and Compustat Global
for the Eurozone firms. Data on loans and bonds are the same used in the previous chapter
obtained from Reuters’ Dealscan and Thomson One Banker respectively. I also use Orbis
banks’ focus database to obtain bank addresses to match banks and firms according to their
proximity. 17
The dependent variable is LBit which is the total amount of loans obtained by a firm in
a quarter weighted by the total amount raised. The dependent variable obtained allows to
include in the sample all the observations in which both loans and bonds are issued from a
15The BEPS is a survey on the use of lending techniques gathered from face-to-face interviews with 397
bank CEOs.
16See Gertler and Gilchrist (1994)
17Formerly Bankscope
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given firm in a given quarter. Data on the lending variables are used to proxy borrowing
conditions. The lending variables are the following: 1) Lending standards, 2) Lending growth,
3) Non-performing loans, 4) Loan allowances, and 5) Monetary policy.
Data on lending standards are collected for U.S, U.K. and Eurozone firms from the Fed,
the BoE, and the ECB respectively. The availability of data that can be obtained for the
Eurozone through the bank lending survey is subordinated to the date of the first issue
of the ECB’s bank lending survey in 2002. In order not to have an unbalanced sample
with observation anterior to the 2002 only belonging to non-Eurozone firms, I truncate the
sample to obtain a shorter time window starting in 2002 and ending in 2015. Data on credit
standards are compiled from central banks’ surveys. “Lending growth” is a variable reporting
data on the flow of funds available for U.S., UK and Eurozone which can be downloaded from
the Fed of St. Louis website, the BoE website and the ECB website respectively. Monetary
policy is defined as deviation from the Taylor rule in all of the three macro area considered
in the analysis. Deviations are calculated using Taylor (1993) for U.S. and Maddaloni and
Peydro´ (2011) for UK and Eurozone. Finally, non-performing loans and loan allowances are
constructed as an average of big banks accounting data and they are both expressed as a
fraction of total loans.
In this chapter, data are not filtered for the past issuance of bonds as it was the case
in the previous chapter; both short-term and longer-term loans are included. The rationale
for not filtering the data is that I want to include in the sample also observations for firms
who choose to tap the bond market only rarely because the terms of the loan deal they
can get from the bank are in general more convenient. While this approach is reasonable
given the long maturity of corporate bonds, in the section dedicated to robustness checks I
replicate the analysis in the main specification using filtered data to dispel doubt that the
results are driven from the choice of the filters. I find that even with a narrow filter on bond
issuance the results remain qualitatively the same. The coefficients in the robustness section
are consistent with those in the main specification and in some cases the evidences are even
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more robust.
B. Methodology
In section 4 I perform two separate empirical analysis. In the first subsection I focus on
the effect of firm’s main lender fundamentals on the supply of bank loans. I identify the main
lender for a firm as the syndicated loan lead arranger that appear the most in the credit
history of a firm. I also proxy the fundamentals of the main lender using measures of capital
ratio and loan allowances. If there is more than one lead arranger suitable to be classified
as main lender, I create a synthetic main lender by taking the average of their fundamentals
data.
The coefficient of interest is the one associated to the interaction of the aggregate lending
variable with the lender specific variable (ML). In the main specification theML variable is
the combined Tier 1 - Tier 2 Capital ratio. In section 5 I use two alternative measures of main
lender health status to check the robustness of the results. The variable ML changes across
firms and over time thus allowing the inclusion of calendar fixed effects in the robustness
section. The main regression equation in the first part of the empirical analysis is the
following:
LBit = α + µi + β1(MLit ∗ Act) + β2MLit + β3Act + γEurozonect + δXit + εit
Where LBit is the dependent variable, Act is the aggregate lending variable, and (MLit ∗
Act) is the explanatory variable of interest. The rest of the variables included in the specifi-
cation ensure the conditional exogeneity of the model. µi are firm fixed effects, Eurozone is
a dummy controlling for countries within the eurozone, and Xit is a matrix of firm specific
controls.
In the second part of the empirical section I focus specifically on relationship lenders
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rather than the more general concept of main lender. The identification of relationship
banks is more challenging than the simple main lender identification strategy provided in
Sufi (2007); in fact, whether a loan is granted to a firm as a result of relationship lending or
transaction lending is not directly observable. In empirical tests of the relationship lending
hypothesis scholars have used several different methodologies to proxy the strength of the
relationship. Most of the empirical literature choose the time since the bank and the borrower
initiated the first deal to measure the strength of the relationship. Intuitively, the longest
the relationship the more information a bank is able to collect from the firm and thus can
tailor the loan contracts to the specific borrower. While this measure seems appropriate,
one must be careful when using it. In fact when using the duration of the relationship to
proxy the lending relationship it is necessary to include in the analysis also the age of the
firm since the two variables are highly correlated. 18
The length of the relationship proxies the private information that the lender has been
able to collect from the firm over the years, whereas age reflects public information on
the reputation and survival of the firm. Moreover the duration proxy gives low weight to
relatively new relationships which might be important in terms of expectations of future
deals with the same borrower.
Sharpe (1990) uses an alternative measure of relationship lending. In his analysis the
strength of the relationship is proxied by the number of simultaneous lending relationship
that a firm entertain with banks. In the extreme case of an exclusive relationship, the
informed bank obtain a monopoly on the information relative to the firm and this in turn
promotes closer link between the firm and the bank. Although the use of such proxy is
backed by theory, Elsas (2005) points out that “exclusivity of a bank relationship is neither
a necessary nor a sufficient condition for relationship lending.
Alessandrini, Presbitero, and Zazzaro (2009) use yet another measure of relationship
18Berger and Udell (1995) and Cole and Walraven (1998) find that the length of the relationship and the
age of the firms are highly correlated
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lending. In their paper they proxy the strength of the relationship with the distance between
the bank and the firm headquarter. The rationale behind the use of the distance measure is
that the farther the firm and bank are to each other the more difficult become for the bank
to collect soft information thus making more difficult the evaluation of the loan application,
and in turn weakening the relationship lending. The scope of the relationship has been also
used as a proxy but it is unclear whether is necessary for a bank to provide multiple services
to firms in order to be considered a relationship lender. Indeed, while a firm purchasing over
the course of its life additional services besides the standard deposit and loans business from
the same bank is clearly releasing more information creating a de facto relationship with the
bank, it is not rare the case in which firms create strong lending relationship with the bank
even in absence of additional financial services.
In this chapter, a firm-bank link is considered to be a long-term relationship if the bank
branch or headquarter is in the same city as the borrower headquarter and the two interact
through loan contracts multiple times over the years. This approach put together two of
the main approach of the literature. The one considering the length of the relationship and
the one that considers the proximity between the bank and the lender. The idea is that the
combination of the two should help mitigating the objections raised for each measure indi-
vidually. My identification strategy to isolate the effect of relationship lending is threefold.
In the first step I construct the relationship lending variable as described. The length of
the relationship measure will give a low weight to newly formed relationship between bank
and firms, whilst the proximity of the bank and the firm headquarters could be meaningless
if they interact only once. Therefore, I assign a relationship lender to a firm only if the
headquarter (or branch) of the bank and the firm are in the same city, and they interact
multiple times in different years. At this point someone may raise the issue of a possible
endogeneity problem that the correlation between the strength of the bank-firm relation-
ship and the availability of credit is due to variables capturing the effect of informational
differences rather than the actual effect of having a relationship bank. To make sure I am
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capturing the effect that relationship lending has on the probability of obtaining a loan, I
add two further steps to the identification strategy.
The second part of the identification strategy is related to the way the dependent variable
LBit is designed. Firm-quarters that are not excluded from the initial sample are all relative
to firms receiving financing either in the form of bond or loan. If the relationship lending
variable (RLit) were to capture a general information problem, then we should observe a
non-significant point estimate for the key coefficient of interest since this general information
problem should be reflected in a lower availability of all sources of funding for the specific
firm and not simply a reduction in bank loans.
Finally, the last piece of the identification strategy is the empirical specification. Using a
sort of difference-in-differences approach on a panel of firm-quarters from different countries,
I make sure that any fixed difference between firms with a bank relationship and firms
without a bank relationship are automatically netted out from the differencing, as well as
any compositional effect due to firm specific characteristics is absorbed by the firm-fixed
effects. The regression equation underlying the model is the following:
LBit = α + µi + β1Act + β2RLit + γ(RLit ∗ Act) + δ1Xit + δ2Trendit + εit
Where LBit is the ratio of the loan amount raised by a firm in a given quarter and the
total amount raised by the firm in the quarter. A value equal to 0 indicates that the firm
only raised funds in the bond market, a ratio equal to one indicates that firms only get
a bank loan in the quarter, a value between 0 and 1 indicates a combination of bank and
market finance. RLit is the measure of relationship lending described above. RLit varies
across firms and time according to the evolution of firm-bank relationships. The relationship
lending variable switches from 0 to 1 at the time the second banking relationship is formed,
meaning that the variable will always be lagged by one period. The lending variables Act
represent the aggregate lending condition in the economy and are collected for U.S., U.K.
and Eurozone separately. Xit is a matrix of firms’ control variables and Trendit is a firm
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specific time trend to take into account the correlation between the age of the firms and the
number of interactions between the borrower and the lender. Firm’s controls included are:
”lag log assets, lag log property plant and equipment, ROA, market to book assets, lagged
returns, and a dummy indicating whether the firm paid dividend in a given quarter.
Finally, the interaction of RLit and the lending variable is associated to the key coefficient
of interest. A positive coefficient would imply that when credit is tight firms with close bank
relationships manage to raise even more funds from banks compared to those firm who
use transaction banking to finance their activities. This could be the result of the flight to
quality prediction. In Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) model, banks experiencing a negative
shock, shift the composition of their borrower pool towards firms for which they have an
informational advantage compared to other lenders. In other words, during an economic
downturn, firms with a strong bank relationship should experience a smaller reduction in
lending compared to other firms.19 The evidences provided in the empirical analysis are
consistent with the theoretical prediction of Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006).
4. Empirical Analysis
The sample analyzed in this section spans the years from 2002 to 2015 and is a panel
of firm level data collected at quarterly frequencies. The dependent variable is the loan-to-
total-amount ratio as described in the methodology section. The choice of the dependent
variable is part of the identification strategy in this chapter. All the coefficients in Table
II and Table III are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at quarterly level.
The regression equation also includes firms fixed effects to account for compositional effects.
Table I contains descriptive statistics of the sample used. I report data on the amounts
and number of loans and bonds before and after the beginning of the 2007 financial crisis. It
is immediate to notice that the amounts of both loans and bonds increase consistently after
19The downside of relationship lending should be reflected in higher costs for borrowing over the entire
length of the relationship due to the monopoly rent acquired by the bank through informations.
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Table I. Descriptive Statistics
This table reports the descriptive statistics for the sample of firms included for the analysis in this section.
Note that relationship lender and main lender may coincide for some firms.
Bonds Loans
Number 6,944 6,232
Before 2007 4,278 3,793
After 2007 2,666 2,439
Mean(millions) 507 637
Before 2007(millions) 273 372
After 2007(millions) 880 1,050
Median(millions) 250 170
Before 2007(millions) 150 100
After 2007(millions) 500 300
Total Main lenders Relationship
Lenders 5286 50 81
Main Lender’s variables Mean Median Std. Dev
Tier 1 Capital ratio 9.721392 8.6 2.777887
Combined Capital ratio 13.18969 12.43 2.450871
Loan allowances 8.522282 8.83 1.362317
2007. However the total number of loans and bonds decrease. The descriptive result, in line
with the findings in this thesis, can be interpreted as a flight to quality from the investors
side. In fact, from the description of the data, it appears that investors (banks and private
investors in the bond market) after 2007 preferred to lend more to a smaller number of firms
they deemed safe, thus cutting funding to lower quality firms. The rest of Table I reports
statistics on the number of lenders and the description of the variables used in the main
lender analysis.
A. Main lender
For this part of the analysis I assigned a main lender to each firm and collected balance
sheet data to proxy the “health” status of the lender. The main lender has been selected as
the syndicated loan’s lead arranger that appears the most times in the credit history of the
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firm. If there is more than one candidate, I create a synthetic lender by taking the average
of their balance sheet data. In Table II I report the figures resulting from the first empirical
exercise.
The variable representing the main lender status that I choose in this specification is the
combined risk-adjusted capital ratio. In the robustness section I try the more restrictive Tier
1 capital ratio and the lagged value of the log loan allowances over total loans granted by
the bank to proxy main lender’s fundamentals, and I find the results to be consistent with
those obtained in the main specification.
In column (1) the coefficient of the interaction variable is not significant. This indicates
that when the bank credit standards tightens the capital ratio of the bank, which in this
analysis I use as proxy for bank’s fundamentals, does not affect bank lending to firms 20
Hence the lending standards variable does not seem to influence the debt structure choice of
unconstrained firms.
The first interesting result is reported in column (2). In this specification the lending
variable is aggregate lending growth. The coefficients for the lending variable level is positive
and significant at 1% level as expected; nonetheless, when the variable is interacted with
ML the coefficient is not significant, indicating that the status of the main lender does
not seem to have an effect when lending grows. The coefficients of the level variables non-
performing loans and loan allowances in columns (3) and (4) respectively are consistent with
the findings in the previous chapter of this thesis. An increase in non-performing loans
or in loan allowances cause a switch of the source of funding from bank loans to bonds.
The coefficient of the interaction variable in both specification is also negative and strongly
significant suggesting that the characteristics of the main lender do affect the choice of the
debt structure. In particular the two coefficients show that when aggregate credit conditions
are poor, the fundamentals of the main lender affect the firm’s choice between bank loans and
20Note that here even if the firm is known by the lender, we are not assuming a relationship lender link
between them.
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bonds. Firms with a non-financially sound main lender will switch more to bond financing
compared to other firms.
In the last column the deviations from the Taylor rule are taken as proxy of the monetary
policy stance. The monetary policy variable does not interact with the main lender status,
hence the non significant coefficient for the interaction variable. The coefficient of the level
variable is again consistent with the findings of the previous chapter signalling that when
the monetary policy stance is loose firms will be likely to switch from bank financing to bond
financing.
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Table II. Main Lender
The table reports the results of the main specification using main lender characteristics interacted with the five lending variables
considered: 1) Lending standards, 2) Lending growth, 3)Non-performing loans, 4) Loan allowances and 5) Monetary policy.
The dependent variable is LBit which is the ratio of the amount of loans raised by a firm in a given quarter divided by the
total amount raised by the firm in that quarter. LBit equals 0 if a firm issue loans only, equals 1 if the firm issues bonds and
is a number between 0 and 1 if a firm issued both forms of finance in a given quarter. The variable ML is the time series of
quarterly combined Tier 1-Tier 2 capital ratio for each main lender associated to a firm. The interaction term is the product
of the ML variable with the lending variable used in the specification. Each coefficient reported results from an OLS regression
which includes firm-fixed effects and controls for firms’ characteristics. The estimation period is 2002:Q1 - 2015:Q2, all errors
are clustered quarterly.
Dependent Variable: LBit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lending variables:
(ML*Lending variable) -0.000225 -0.00101 0.943*** 1.839*** -0.00365
(0.000161) (0.00180) (0.291) (0.616) (0.00470)
Lending standards 0.00274
(0.000217)
Lending growth 0.0175
(0.0239)
NPL’s -15.48***
(4.288)
Loan allowances -27.18***
(8.694)
Monetary policy 0.0834
(0.0648)
Eurozone 0.211** 0.243*** 0.391*** 0.449*** 0.231***
(0.103) (0.0836) (0.0993) (0.0908) (0.0864)
ML -0.0236*** -0.0221*** -0.0328*** -0.0589*** -0.0210***
(0.00388) (0.00388) (0.00667) (0.0131) (0.00406)
Firm’s characteristics:
Lag log assets -0.0107 -0.0105 -0.0285 -0.0181 -0.0104
(0.0272) (0.0261) (0.0275) (0.0273) (0.0259)
Lag log ppe 0.0273 0.0245 0.0221 0.0254 0.0252
(0.0279) (0.0267) (0.0270) (0.0275) (0.0265)
ROA 0.188 0.200 -0.0602 0.0148 0.181
(0.340) (0.342) (0.344) (0.342) (0.339)
Market to Book asset 6.97e-09 1.68e-08 2.60e-08 6.61e-08 1.19e-08
(1.73e-08) (2.18e-08) (5.64e-08) (5.67e-08) (2.10e-08)
Lagged returns -0.0115* -0.0122* -0.0106* -0.0122* -0.0142**
(0.00603) (0.00620) (0.00635) (0.00630) (0.00633)
Lag leverage -0.0559 -0.0530 -0.0315 -0.0422 -0.0587
(0.0599) (0.0596) (0.0627) (0.0632) (0.0588)
Dividend -0.0503** -0.0492** -0.0476** -0.0473** -0.0536***
(0.0201) (0.0201) (0.0214) (0.0216) (0.0190)
Constant 0.978*** 0.954*** 1.136*** 1.472*** 0.946***
(0.0561) (0.0550) (0.0908) (0.177) (0.0569)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y
Calendar FE N N N N N
Observations 6,628 6,675 6,063 6,065 6,671
R-squared 0.575 0.575 0.573 0.571 0.577
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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B. Relationship lender
In Table III I report results from the main regression specification testing the relationship
lending hypothesis. The sample is a panel of firm level data collected at quarterly frequencies.
The dependent variable is LBit and is part of the identification strategy in this chapter.
All the coefficients in Table III are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered
at quarterly level. The regression equation also includes firms fixed effects to account for
compositional effects. Finally the difference-in-differences approach net out all of the fixed
differences between firms that are in the treatment group (those who have a close lending
relationship with a bank) and firms in the control group. The key variable of interest in this
chapter is the interaction between the lending variable and the relationship lending variable.
In column (1) the coefficient of the interaction variable is positive and significant at
5% level. According to the estimated coefficient, when credit standards tighten, firms with
close bank relationship should be favoured in their loan application compared to other firms.
This is evidence of a flight to quality for banks who experience a shock in loanable funds.
Conversely, the coefficient for the lending variable is negative and is significant at 1% level,
showing that while the lending standards are relevant in explaining why some firms choose
to switch from bank loans to bonds, the presence of relationship lending can attenuate the
shift from one form of financing to the other.
In column (2) the coefficient of the interaction variable has a negative sign and it is
significant at 5% level. The lending growth variable also presents a positive coefficient. I
interpret this result as an indication that in normal times, when lending growth is high,
having a close relationship with a bank it is not enhancing the firm’s probability to obtain
credit, if something it might push away from bank loans and towards market finance some
firms who have the possibility to switch to alternative forms of financing in order to avoid
to pay the monopoly rent to the relationship bank. This hypothesis is also consistent with
the academic literature on relationship lending (see Rajan (1992) and Bolton et al. (2016)).
In column (3) the variable of interest is formed by the interaction of the relationship
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lending variable and the non-performing loans variable. The point estimate for non per-
forming loans is negative - as expected from theoretical literature and empirical evidences
provided in the previous chapter. The coefficient of the interacted variable instead is positive
and significant at 1% level. The coefficient estimated for the lending variable in column (3)
is negative and significant at 1% level. The sign of the coefficient implies that firms tend
to resort less to bank loans and more on bond financing when non performing loans in the
banking industry increase. However, we are more interested in the interpretation of the co-
efficient of the interaction variable which is positive and strongly significant. The sign of the
coefficient indicates that if a firm set up a close relationship with a bank, then the reduction
in bank loan financing caused by the high level of non performing loans in the economy is
less severe. Firms closely connected to a relationship bank still find relatively convenient
to apply for loans relative to the costs of issuing bonds even in period of instability for the
banking industry.
Overall the presence of relationship banking can improve the economic terms of the loan
contract for the firms. The finding can be interesting also from a regulator point of view.
The development of relationship banking links presents a trade-off for the firms. On the
one hand it reduces competitiveness in the credit market allowing relationship banks to
extract monopoly rents from the firm due to the informational advantage they acquired
compared to other banks. On the other hand relationship lenders can mitigate the adverse
effect of a negative economic shock by providing stable funding to profitable firms. The
relationship lending practice can also reduce the problem of liquidity hold-ups that plagued
the Eurozone financial system and that would threaten the functioning of the monetary
policy lending channel. According to results in column (3), relationship banks tend to grant
loans to already known firms with good investment projects as long as they have available
funds, despite the high level of non-performing loans in the banking industry. Results in
column (4) follow those in column (3). The loan allowances variable is very correlated to the
amount of non-performing loans and therefore it is also correlated to the performance of the
81
banking industry. For the same reason mentioned above, a firm that usually relies heavily
on relationship funds will experience a lesser reduction of bank funds availability compared
to firms without bank’s ties.
Finally, in column (5) the coefficient for the monetary policy variable is positive and sig-
nificant. I interpret the sign of the coefficient as a by-product of central bank interventions
to keep yields low during crises, and the shortage of banks’loanable funds which lead to a
consequential increase in the cost of bank’s funds relative to the costs in the bond market.
21 However, as theory predicts, the increase in costs (and decline in loanable funds) should
be experienced to a lesser extent from firms linked to banks through a significant lending
relationship. The negative coefficient for the interaction variable in the last column is consis-
tent with the above mentioned theoretical prediction. Indeed, the firms who usually obtain
loans from a relationship banks, are less likely to switch to bonds even in period in which
the liquidity injections of the central banks lower the yields of corporate bonds.
21LSAP implemented by the Fed, QE from BoE and QE from ECB
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Table III. Relationship Lender
Table III reports the results of the main specification for the five lending variables considered: 1) Lending standards, 2) Lending
growth, 3)Non-performing loans, 4) Loan allowances and 5) Monetary policy. The dependent variable is LBit which is the ratio
of the amount of loans raised by a firm in a given quarter divided by the total amount raised by the firm in that quarter. LBit
equals 0 if a firm issue loans only, equals 1 if the firm issues bonds and is a number between 0 and 1 if a firm issued both forms
of finance in a given quarter. RL is the relationship lending variable. The interaction term is the product of the RL variable
with the lending variable used in the specification. Each coefficient reported is the result of an OLS regression which includes
firm-fixed effects and controls for firms’ characteristics.The estimation period is 2002:Q1 - 2015:Q2, all errors are clustered
quarterly.
Dependent Variable: LBit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lending variables:
(RL*Lending variable) 0.000805** -0.00477** 0.0191*** 0.0190** -0.0240**
(0.000315) (0.00215) (0.00665) (0.00717) (0.00903)
Lending standards -0.000985***
(0.000340)
Lending growth 0.00251*
(0.00146)
NPL’s -0.0327***
(0.00627)
Loan allowances -0.0400***
(0.00816)
Monetary policy 0.0142**
(0.00617)
RL 0.908*** 0.912*** 0.932*** 0.930*** 0.905***
(0.0116) (0.0104) (0.00954) (0.00968) (0.0113)
Firm’s characteristics:
Lag log assets -0.0457*** -0.0375*** -0.0301** -0.0323** -0.0360**
(0.0140) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0139) (0.0139)
Lag log ppe -0.0109 -0.0141 -0.0154 -0.0145 -0.0144
(0.0102) (0.00975) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0100)
ROA -0.142 -0.102 -0.134 -0.129 -0.0962
(0.130) (0.138) (0.137) (0.137) (0.138)
Market to book assets 6.08e-09* 4.21e-09 4.80e-09 4.81e-09 5.96e-09
(3.43e-09) (3.41e-09) (3.61e-09) (3.52e-09) (4.00e-09)
Lagged return 0.00187 0.00937 0.00861 0.00897 0.00953
(0.00527) (0.00643) (0.00653) (0.00653) (0.00668)
Lag leverage 0.0804** 0.0747** 0.0791** 0.0784** 0.0809**
(0.0346) (0.0366) (0.0381) (0.0381) (0.0361)
Dividend -0.0111 -0.00782 -0.00654 -0.00698 -0.00842
(0.00940) (0.00889) (0.00896) (0.00895) (0.00902)
Time trend -0.00923*** -0.00761*** -0.00591*** -0.00465** -0.00752***
(0.00197) (0.00206) (0.00206) (0.00211) (0.00201)
Constant 1.101*** 1.051*** 0.981*** 0.990*** 1.038***
(0.0748) (0.0781) (0.0655) (0.0663) (0.0769)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y
Calendar FE N N N N N
Observations 16,784 16,909 16,150 16,150 16,585
R-squared 0.503 0.503 0.508 0.507 0.501
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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5. Robustness
In this section I provide results for alternative specifications of the main empirical analy-
sis. The objective of this section is to provide additional support to the evidences presented
in section 4.
A. Alternative measure of main lender fundamentals
Another indicator of bank’s “health” is the risk adjusted capital ratio. A safer bank
should have a capital ratio higher than a riskier one. In Table IV I repeat the empirical
exercise in the main lender section using two alternativeML variables. In Panel A I measure
the status of the bank using the lagged value of the Tier1 capital ratio. All the elements
constituting the Tier 2 capital are excluded from the numerator thus making the number
smaller compared to the combined Tier 1-Tier 2 capital ratio. Tier 1 capital ratio is more
restrictive than the combined capital ratio, thus providing a more conservative measure of
bank’s soundness.
In Panel B the main lender variable is the lagged value of the log loan allowances. Lag log
loan allowances has to be interpreted in the opposite way compared to capital ratio. High
value of the variable means that the bank is foreseeing many delinquent loans in the near
future
The figures in Table IV point in the same direction of those in the main regressions in
Table II. The coefficients of the interaction variable both in Panel A and in Panel B are
strongly significant and positive. A higher capital ratio is a signal of a safer bank. The
sign of the coefficients supports the hypotesis that main lender characteristics affect firm’s
funding decisions. In particular the sign of the coefficients for the interaction variables in
Panel A and Panel B confirms that a firm interacting with safer banks -as measured by
the capital ratio- tend to switch less from bank loans to bonds when the aggregate lending
conditions deteriorates.
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Table IV. Robustness 1/4
The table reports the results of the main lender analysis using alternative measures of main lender’s health status interacted
with the five lending variables considered: 1) Lending standards, 2) Lending growth, 3)Non-performing loans, 4) Loan allowances
and 5) Monetary policy. The dependent variable is LBit which is the ratio of the amount of loans raised by a firm in a given
quarter divided by the total amount raised by the firm in that quarter. LBit equals 0 if a firm issue loans only, equals 1 if the
firm issues bonds and is a number between 0 and 1 if a firm issued both forms of finance in a given quarter. In Panel A the
variable ML is the time series of the Tier 1 capital ratio for each main lender associated to a firm; whereas in Panel B ML is
a time series of lag log loan allowances of each main lender. The interaction term is the product of the ML variable with the
lending variable used in the specification. Each coefficient reported results from an OLS regression which includes firm-fixed
effects and controls for firms’ characteristics. The estimation period is 2002:Q1 - 2015:Q2, all errors are clustered quarterly.
Panel A: Tier 1 Capital Ratio
Dependent Variable: LBit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lending variables:
(ML*Lending Variable) -0.000242 -0.00107 0.907*** 1.694*** -0.00145
(0.000145) (0.00123) (0.233) (0.502) (0.00467)
Lending standards 0.00194
(0.00142)
Lending growth 0.0132
(0.0111)
NPL’s -11.78***
(2.553)
Loan allowances -19.40***
(5.361)
Monetary policy 0.0445
(0.0495)
ML -0.0215*** -0.0196*** -0.0313*** -0.0542*** -0.0180***
(0.00370) (0.00372) (0.00614) (0.0114) (0.00382)
Eurozone 0.215** 0.243*** 0.355*** 0.414*** 0.234***
(0.102) (0.0852) (0.0945) (0.0868) (0.0874)
Control Variables Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 6,596 6,643 6,030 6,032 6,639
R-squared 0.576 0.577 0.575 0.574 0.578
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Panel B: Loan allowances
Dependent Variable: LBit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lending variables:
(ML*Lending variable) 0.000433 0.000292 -1.512*** -3.462*** 0.00462
(0.000363) (0.00439) (0.499) (1.202) (0.0157)
Lending standards 0.000655
0.000413
Lending growth 0.00692**
(0.00264)
NPL’s -2.293***
0.509
Loan allowances -4.825***
(1.212)
Monetary policy 0.0460***
0.00955
ML 0.0285** 0.0306*** 0.0677*** 0.109*** 0.0310***
(0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0139) (0.0260) (0.0110)
Eurozone 0.218** 0.258*** 0.358*** 0.413*** 0.239***
(0.106) (0.0793) (0.0924) (0.0872) (0.0861)
Control Variables Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 6,914 6,961 6,348 6,349 6,955
R-squared 0.565 0.566 0.566 0.564 0.568
B. Including time fixed effects
In this section of the robustness checks I introduce quarterly calendar fixed effects. The
introduction of a calendar dummy will absorb all the calendar related effects that are constant
across firms and varies quarter by quarter. Calendar fixed effects net out effects related to
the two crises included in the sample (the 2007-2009 financial crisis in U.S. and the 2009
sovereign debt crisis in Europe). The downside of including time fixed effects is that the
effect of time-varying only variables will be absorbed. Including calendar fixed effects might
absorb all the significance from the lending variables’ coefficient.
In Table V the estimation of the main lender regression is repeated including calendar
fixed effects. The coefficient of the interaction in column (4) (that uses the loan allowances
as lending variable) loses some significance and it is now significant only at 5%. The rest of
the coefficients are very close in magnitude to those obtained in Table II and they are still
significant. Overall the effect documented in Table II seems robust to the introduction of
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quarterly calendar effects.
Table V. Robustness 2/4
Table V reports results of the main lender specification including calendar fixed effects for the five lending variables considered:
1) Lending standards, 2) Lending growth, 3)Non-performing loans, 4) Loan allowances and 5) Monetary policy. The dependent
variable LBit equals 0 if a firm issue loans only, equals 1 if the firm issues bonds and is a number between 0 and 1 if a firm issued
both forms of finance in a given quarter. ML is the combined capital ratio. The interaction term is the product of the ML
variable with the lending variable used in the specification. Each coefficient reported is the result of an OLS regression which
includes both firm-fixed effects and calendar-quarter fixed effects. The specification also controls for firms’ characteristics. The
estimation period is 2002:Q1 - 2015:Q2, all errors are clustered quarterly.
Dependent Variable: LBit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lending variables:
(ML*Lending variable) -0.000213 -0.000962 1.032*** 1.880** -0.000488
(0.000180) (0.00192) (0.325) (0.767) (0.00596)
Lending standards 0.00161
(0.00244)
Lending growth 0.0125
(0.0256)
NPL’s -15.12***
(5.134)
Loan allowances -27.15**
(11.57)
Monetary policy 0.0310
(0.0857)
ML -0.0141*** -0.0139*** -0.0331*** -0.0558*** -0.0148***
(0.00444) (0.00425) (0.00660) (0.0173) (0.00424)
Eurozone 0.209** 0.224** 0.371*** 0.414*** 0.222**
(0.0994) (0.0886) (0.0918) (0.0935) (0.0884)
Constant 0.696*** 0.698*** 1.043*** 1.344*** 0.712***
(0.0835) (0.0801) (0.143) (0.282) (0.0798)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y
Calendar FE Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 6,628 6,675 6,063 6,065 6,671
R-squared 0.604 0.603 0.601 0.601 0.604
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
In Table VI the only lending variables that remain significant -even after the introduction
of time fixed effects- are the non-performing loans variable and the loan allowances variable
in column (3) and column (4) respectively. The two lending variables maintain the negative
sign despite with a lower magnitude. The evidences in this chapter suggest that these two
variables are the most significant indicators of deteriorating lending conditions and are those
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Table VI. Robustness 3/4
Table VI reports results of the specification including calendar fixed effects for the five lending variables considered: 1) Lending
standards, 2) Lending growth, 3)Non-performing loans, 4) Loan allowances and 5) Monetary policy. The dependent variable
LBit equals 0 if a firm issue loans only, equals 1 if the firm issues bonds and is a number between 0 and 1 if a firm issued both
forms of finance in a given quarter. RL is the relationship lending variable. The interaction term is the product of the RL
variable with the lending variable used in the specification. Each coefficient reported is the result of an OLS regression which
includes both firm-fixed effects and calendar-quarter fixed effects. The specification also controls for firms’ characteristics. The
estimation period is 2002:Q1 - 2015:Q2, all errors are clustered quarterly.
Dependent Variable: LBit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lending variables:
(RL*Lending variable) 0.000771** -0.00351 0.0168** 0.0173** -0.0157*
(0.000317) (0.00217) (0.00664) (0.00727) (0.00864)
Lending standards -0.000488
(0.000373)
Lending growth -0.00129
(0.00184)
NPL’s -0.0239***
(0.00750)
Loan allowances -0.0344***
(0.00879)
Monetary policy 0.00707
(0.00637)
RL 0.883*** 0.883*** 0.909*** 0.907*** 0.879***
(0.0153) (0.0148) (0.0114) (0.0117) (0.0150)
Constant 0.971*** 0.945*** 0.911*** 0.906*** 0.945***
(0.0736) (0.0698) (0.0719) (0.0718) (0.0702)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y
Calendar FE Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 16,784 16,909 16,150 16,150 16,585
R-squared 0.520 0.521 0.521 0.521 0.518
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
whose changes are more likely to prompt firms to modify their debt structure. Nevertheless,
we are interested only in the coefficients associated to the interaction between the lending
variable and the lender’s type. All of the coefficients of the key variable of interest from
column (1) to column (5) maintain the same sign with respect to coefficients in the main
specification and also the significance levels follow those already reported in Table III.
The coefficients in this robustness section confirm the main finding that the structure of
the banking system is a main determinant of the firm choice of financing. The only exception
88
in this table is given by the interaction between the relationship lending variable and the
lending growth. In this case it appears that once controlled for the quarterly calendar effects,
the aggregate lending growth does not interact with the relationship lending variable in a
significant way. I interpret this result as if growth in lending does not affect differentially
firms with bank relationship ties compared to other firms.
C. Conditioning on past bond issuance and debt maturity
In Table VII the main specification of Table III is run several times with different filters.
Only coefficients for RL, the lending variable, and the interaction between the two variables
are reported as long as their level of significance. All the regressions are estimated using
OLS and include firm-level fixed effects. In the top row the columns refer to coefficients that
are estimated as follows: i) without applying any bond filtering, ii) with a standard 5 year
filter on past issuance, and iii) with a 2 years filter in columns (1), (2), and (3) respectively.
Each of these three columns is further divided into “Long-term” which refers to coefficient
obtained from a sample where shorter maturity debt obligations (with maturity<1 year) are
filtered out and “Full” in which the sample is not filtered for the maturities. The column
“No filter-Full” reports the benchmark results of the main regression specification.
The signs of the coefficients estimated in Table VII using different subsamples point in
the same direction as those in the benchmark specification. Also their significance levels
closely follow the benchmark. The magnitude of the coefficients slightly varies but is overall
consistent with the evidences provided in this chapter. The robustness of the estimated
coefficients to the applied filters significantly reduces the probability that the higher amount
of bank credit obtained by firms in periods of monetary contraction is not due to the lack
of accessibility to the bond market. Moreover, even when excluding shorter term loans, the
coefficients do not change sensibly. I interpret this as evidence that the point estimates are
capturing the effect of relationship lending. Informed lenders, using firm specific information
collected over the years, do not necessarily lend funds for short terms as could be the case
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Table VII. Robustness 4/4
Table VII reports the results of the main regression on different subsamples filtered according to past bond issuance and debt
maturity. The dependent variable LBit equals 0 if a firm issue loans only, equals 1 if the firm issues bonds and is a number
between 0 and 1 if a firm issued both forms of finance in a given quarter. RL is the relationship lending variable. The interaction
term is the product of the RL variable with the lending variable used in the specification. 5Y filter means that firm-quarters
for which no bonds have been issued in the previous 5 years are dropped from the sample, 2Y filter means that firm-quarters
for which no bonds have been issued in the previous 2 years are dropped from the sample and No filter does not filter for past
bonds’ issuance. Long term filter exclude all forms of debt with maturity lower than 12 months. Each coefficient reported is
the result of an OLS regression which includes firm-fixed effects and controls for firms’ characteristics. The estimation period
is 2002:Q1 - 2015:Q2, all errors are clustered quarterly.
Bond filter: No filter 5Y filter 2Y filter
Maturity filter: Long-Term Full Long-Term Full Long-Term Full
RL 0.907*** 0.908*** 0.894*** 0.895*** 0.880*** 0.882***
(RL*Lending standards) 0.000842*** 0.000805** 0.00149*** 0.00152*** 0.00144*** 0.00154***
Lending standards -0.00108*** -0.000985*** -0.00208*** -0.00196*** -0.00243*** -0.00237***
RL 0.911*** 0.912*** 0.904*** 0.904*** 0.892*** 0.894***
(RL*Lending growth) -0.00485** -0.00477** -0.00739** -0.00666* -0.0110** -0.00954*
Lending growth 0.00238* 0.00251* 0.00143 0.00159 0.00366* 0.00385*
RL 0.932*** 0.932*** 0.923*** 0.922*** 0.912*** 0.912***
(RL*NPL’s) 0.0201*** 0.0191** 0.0199** 0.0183** 0.0215** 0.0199**
NPL’s -0.0348*** -0.0327*** -0.0428*** -0.0385*** -0.0527*** -0.0486***
RL 0.930*** 0.930*** 0.922*** 0.921*** 0.910*** 0.910***
(RL*Loan allowances) 0.0201*** 0.0190** 0.0205** 0.0189** 0.0218** 0.0202**
Loan allowances -0.0433*** 0.0400*** -0.0555*** -0.0493*** 0.0642*** -0.0584***
RL 0.904*** 0.905*** 0.895*** 0.896*** 0.880*** 0.882***
(RL*Monetary policy) -0.0243*** -0.0240** -0.0251 -0.0233 -0.0338* -0.0313*
Monetary policy 0.0141** 0.0142** 0.0293 0.00356 0.0151 0.0139
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
for transaction lenders. Indeed they can lend for longer term as they are better aware of the
borrower’s ability to repay the debt in the future.
6. Discussion
The role of information has always been crucial in the analysis of bank loan supply
and of its link with the real economy. In this chapter, I investigate how informed lenders’
characteristics affect the debt structure choice of firms. In particular, in section 4 I look at
informed lender characteristics from two different perspectives.
In the first part of the empirical section I define the lead arranger as the informed lender
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following Sufi (2007). Since we are in a world in which borrowers and lenders repeatedly
interact, I further define the lead arranger interacting the most with each borrower as his
main lender. The main lender so defined should therefore be superiorly informed on firm’s
value and could continue lending (or stop lending) despite the credit cycle but only based
on firms’ fundamentals and bank own availability of funds.
The second part of the empirical section deals specifically with the effect of relationship
lending on firms’ debt structure. Relationship lending, in spite of the higher rates charged,
could be beneficial to firms by rolling over debt when transaction banks pull out. Academic
research has tried to shed light on the benefits and the costs that a firms face when choosing
to release soft information to one or few banks over time. The most interesting development
of the research in this field concerns the value of relationship lending in crisis period as
compared to normal period. Previous literature addressed the issue from both a theoretical
and an empirical point of view concluding that relationship lending is useful in periods of
distress because superiorly informed banks will continue lending to profitable firms that
otherwise would be credit rationed. On the other hand, in normal times there is no evidence
of positive impacts of relationship lending on firms; if something the relationship bank will
charge higher prices to exploit the monopoly rent acquired.
The challenge faced by the empirical literature lies in the absence of a proper measure of
relationship lending and thus the need of choosing credible proxies for the latent variable.
The problem of using proxies is that often they can capture a different effect with respect
to the one at which the econometrician aims. Therefore, it is necessary a credible empirical
strategy that addresses both the identification and the endogeneity problems arising in this
field of empirical estimation. I use an empirical strategy that tackle the problems from three
different angles so that I can reasonably assume to have captured the desired effect.
The first step is the definition of the relationship lending variable. Using a combination
of two widely used measures of relationship lending adopted in the literature I am confident
that the variable I construct is highly correlated with the existence of bank-firm long lasting
91
connection. Unfortunately, this is not enough because I could be simply capturing the effect
of a variable correlated to the relationship lending that it is not relationship lending, and it
is correlated to other factors left in the error term. The main candidate confounding factor
is the creditworthiness of the firm.
The second step is to define the dependent variable in a way that if the relationship
lending variable were capturing the effect of a generalised lack of information or a low
creditworthiness of the firm rather than proxying for relationship lending, then there should
be no significant effect in the key coefficient of interest. In fact, in each firm-quarter there is at
least a single debt contract written, thus a decrease in the dependent variable implies a switch
to bond financing. If the effect captured was generalised and not related to relationship
lending this should have affected any form of financing indifferently returning a null coefficient
in statistical sense.
Finally, by using a diff-in-diff approach, all the effects that might have been captured
by the explanatory variable and that were representing fixed differences between firms with
relationship lender links and firms without it are netted out.
The results in section 4 give an interpretation to the apparently controversial figures in
the previous chapter. Indeed, the inclusion in the analysis of factors related to the lender
itself and not only to the borrower shed new light on the reasons why some firms raise
additional funding from banks even when we expect to see a generalized decline in lending.
The additional funding raised during a generalized reduction in loan supply will not be more
costly for firms that are in some way linked to safe lender or alternatively for firms which
entertain a long-lasting lending relationship with one or few specific banks.
The findings of this empirical analysis, and thus the contribution of this chapter to the
literature on the relationship between bank characteristics and the credit cycle, confirm that
informed lender characteristics are relevant in explaining the choice of the firm between
bank debt and market debt. Lead arrangers that interact repeatedly with firms and thus are
superiorly informed on firm’s value, tend to lend more when their fundamentals are strong
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despite the credit cycle. Moreover, when the informed bank is a relationship lender (as
defined in this chapter) the adverse effects of a monetary contraction are reduced.
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IV. The Relative Pricing of Sovereign Credit Risk
After the Eurozone Crisis
94
1. Introduction
Credit derivatives and debt securities are strictly related, since the pricing of both types of
financial assets crucially depends on the risk of default of the reference entity. Credit Default
Swaps (CDS) and bonds issued by the CDS reference entity produce similar exposure to the
investor in terms of risk and return. The CDS provides protection to the acquirer in case of
default of the reference entity, while the bond pays out yields to the bondholder as long as
the reference entity is able to comply with its obligations.
In this paper, we study the relationship between sovereign CDS and sovereign bonds, in
terms of risk and return, for the European countries, during and after the sovereign debt
crisis, from 2010 to 2016. Our main finding is the following: after the launch of the Outright
Monetary Transaction (OMT) Programme, by the European Central Bank, the relative
mispricing of the sovereign credit risk has strongly reduced. We disentangle the effects of
the ECB intervention on the sovereign credit risk market in different ways, and we provide
evidence that the consistent relationship between risk and return for the Eurozone sovereign
securities was restored after the ECB intervention.
Therefore, we contribute to three strands of academic research. We first offer empirical
evidence on the theoretical relationship between CDS premium and bond yields across the
European countries. Hull et al. (2004) point out that, under a large set of assumptions that
ensure absence of frictions in the market, a portfolio including CDS and bond, issued by the
reference entity, generates cash flows equal to a riskless bond in all states of the world. The
difference between the two portfolios cash-flow is defined as basis, and it is usually adopted
as observed measure of mispricing. Hence, the CDS premium should be equal to the excess
risky yield over the risk-free rate (zero-basis condition).
Mispricing has been documented for both corporate (Longstaff et al. (2005), Blanco et al.
(2005)), and sovereign securities (Palladini and Portes (2011), Arce et al. (2013), Fontana
and Scheicher (2016)). These papers argue that CDS spreads are faster in price discovery,
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thus reacting quicker to changes in credit condition. As a consequence, the relationship CDS
spread - bond spread does not hold in the short-term. However, they show that CDS spreads
and bond yields exhibit strong co-movements in a long-term perspective. The widely used
technique of detection of this relationship is the cointegration analysis.
While Palladini and Portes (2011), Arce et al. (2013), and Fontana and Scheicher (2016)
provide evidence of the relative pricing of the sovereign credit risk before and during the
sovereign crisis, we extend the analysis to the period following the ECB intervention, includ-
ing also countries outside the Eurozone, with the aim of highlighting the differential effects
of the unconventional monetary policy.
We show that the equilibrium condition was violated before the announcement of the
OMT, and then restored afterwards, for the Eurozone countries, and in particular for the
peripheral countries of the Eurozone. Instead, the deviation from the equilibrium condition is
persistent and constant over the entire period for the European countries out of the Eurozone.
Moreover, deviations from the equilibrium condition may generate arbitrage opportuni-
ties, that should be unsystematic, and then quickly disappear. We document that these
opportunities were large and persistent before the annnouncement of the OMT, and then
almost disappear, for the Eurozone countries. Instead, we do not observe significant changes
between before and after the annnouncement of the OMT for the countries outside the Euro-
zone. We detail the potential arbitrage strategies implementable by trading sovereign bond
yields and CDS, and we show that in the Eurozone the strategies are largely profitable before
the launch of the OMT, and then converge towards zero-profits afterwards.
As second contribution, we investigate the consistency of the relationship between risk
and return for sovereign securities. The positive relationship between risk and expected
return is one of the milestones in financial theory. Investors are willing to buy risky assets
only if they are rewarded with a proper expected return. The higher is the risk associated
to a given investment, the higher must be the expected return. It turns out that entities
marked by higher risk of default should issue more rewarding securities, compared to safer
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issuers, in order to attract investors. The empirical contradiction of the positive relationship
between risk and expected return is known in the financial literature as distress puzzle.
We document that a distress puzzle at the sovereign level emerges during the crisis period
for the Eurozone countries, and then is ruled out after the launch of the OMT programme.
The distress puzzle has been widely investigated in the context of corporate securities, by
studying the relationship between the firm’s default risk and the expected return on firm’s
equity shares. The empirical evidence is far from being univocal (see, among others, Vassalou
and Xing (2004), Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008), Friewald, Wagner, and Zechner
(2014)). To the best of our knowledge, however, an analysis of the puzzle at the sovereign
level is still missing. As countries do not issue equity, we focus on the debt-related securities.
The intuition is simple. If a country is more likely to default with respect to another
country, then the riskier country must issue debt securities that generate higher expected
return for the investor, with respect to the safer country. In practice, the riskier country must
issue bonds that pay out higher yields. However, it may happen that the riskier country pays
out an excess bond yield, with respect to the safer country, that is too low than it should
be paid, or that the excess bond yield of the riskier country is too high. Therefore, the
monotonic relationship between bond yields and CDS spreads across countries is a necessary
but not sufficient condition to rule out the distress puzzle.
To determine the proper distance between bond yields of different countries, we adopt a
simple credit risk structural model, in order to obtain a simultaneous relationship between
CDS spreads and bond yields for a country. In a structural model, in fact, bond and
CDS are implicitly related at each point in time, as both are derivative contracts of the
same underlying quantity, that are the assets and the liabilities of the reference entity. In
particular, we adopt a first-passage time model, where the issuer defaults as soon as the
value of the assets crosses from above a default boundary, assumed to be deterministic and
constant. This framework is an extension of the seminal model of Merton (1974), where the
issuer may default only at the maturity of the liability. Gapen, Gray, Lim, and Xiao (2011)
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introduce contingent claims analysis to study sovereign credit risk, by using a Merton model.
Hence, the default risk of the country is priced in the CDS spread, where the default
risk is due to the probability that the leverage of the country reaches a given threshold, to
be estimated, that is unsustainable. There is, then, a one-to-one mapping between leverage
and CDS spread, where the model provides the specific functional form of the mapping.
We estimate the model with a non-linear Kalman filter in conjunction with maximum
likelihood, by using daily data on CDS spreads over three different time horizons, i.e. 1,5,
and 10 years. We reconstruct the dynamics of the market value of the leverage of the
country, defined as the ratio between debt and asset, and we estimate the value of the default
boundary. Sovereign assets include current and future surpluses, international reserves, and
residual items (see Gapen et al. (2011)). With the estimated parameters, we are then able to
compute the bond yields implied by the model estimation using Monte Carlo (MC) simulation
techniques. These are the yields implied by the CDS spreads, as we use the observed CDS
spreads, and the relationship between default risk and leverage defined by the model, in
order to estimate the model parameters and to reconstruct the dynamics of the country’s
leverage. Then, we use the relationship between bond yields and leverage defined by the
model in order to compute the implied bond yields.
The implied bond yields are then subtracted from the observed bond yields, thus ob-
taining a net yield for each country, and each point in time. Then, we can evaluate the
monotonicity between CDS spreads and bond yields across countries, for each point in time.
If the excess bond yield of the riskier country, in fact, is too low than it should be, then the
net yield of the safer country would be higher than the net yield of the riskier country. The
result is a not monotonic relationship between CDS spreads and net yields.
To investigate the violation of the monotonicity condition over a cross-section of countries,
we measure the Spearman’s correlation between CDS spreads and net yields, for each point in
time. The Spearman’s correlation evaluates the presence of a monotonic relationship between
two variables, regardless the relationship is linear or not. The closer is the correlation to 1,
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the closer is the distance in the bond yields, across countries, to the cross-sectional distance
that is consistent with the differences across countries in terms of default risk priced in the
CDS. In fact, if we compute the cross-sectional correlation between CDS spreads and risky
bond yields by using the theoretical yield implied by the zero-basis condition, this correlation
is always equal to 1, for each point in time.
We show that the correlation between CDS spreads and net yields randomly moves around
zero for the Eurozone countries before the OMT announcement, then approaching 1 right
after the OMT announcement, and remaining stable afterwards. Instead, the countries out
of the Eurozone do not show significant change in the cross-sectional correlation between
CDS spreads and net yields after the OMT announcement.
Note that if the observed distance between the bond yields of two countries is too high,
then the monotonic relationship between CDS spreads and net yields still holds. Therefore,
in principle, the correlation analysis is able to detect only if there is a sufficient distance
between bond yields, across countries. However, it turns out that if the distance between
the bond yields of two countries is too high, then it is likely that the distance between the
yields of one of the two countries and a third country’s bond yield is too low, thus returning
at the end a lower value of the correlation coefficient.
Finally, we intervene in the discussion on the effects of the unconventional monetary poli-
cies implemented by central banks. Several papers have shown that the ECB intervention in
2012 has significantly lowered the credit spreads of sovereign bond securities, and has also
drastically reduced the level of the premium paid on the CDS. Further to the simultaneous
reduction of sovereign CDS spreads and bond yields, following the ECB intervention, we doc-
ument a strong reduction of the distortion in the relative pricing of the sovereign credit risk,
which restored the equilibrium conditions, and cleared the potential arbitrage opportunities.
Our paper is organized as follows. We first describe the data in the next section, then we
provide empirical evidence on the relationship between CDS spreads and bond yields during
and after the OMT announcement, in section 3. In section 4, we detail the underlying credit
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risk model, and our estimation methodology to compute the implied bond yields. In section
5, we present the empirical investigation. We start the analysis by comparing observed
and implied yields, then we proceed with the correlation analysis, and finally we describe
potential arbitrage strategies and riskless profits. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Data
Our main source of data is Thomson Reuter’s DataStream. We download daily data for
sovereign CDS spreads and sovereign government bond yields for several European countries,
and a sample period going from the 4th January 2010 to the 1st February 2017. Hence, we
collect a time series of 1850 daily observations for each country, for both CDS spreads and
bond yields, and for three time horizons: 1,5, and 10 years maturity. Datastream provides
reference par yields for sovereign bonds at different maturities. The par yield is the internal
rate of return (yield to maturity) of a bond traded at par, and it is expressed as an annualized
figure. Instead, the CDS spread is expressed in basis points, and represents the percentage of
the CDS notional value that the protection buyer must pay, usually at quarterly frequencies,
to the protection seller. CDS spreads are also expressed in annualized terms.
We use all the maturities of the CDS spreads to implement the estimation methodology,
however we focus throughout the paper on the 5-years maturity in order to show the results
of the empirical analysis. We also collect data on the Euribor to represent the European
short term risk-free interest rate curve. At longer maturities we proxy the risk-free rate with
the euro area yield curve computed exclusively on AAA-rated central government bonds,
and we also use a Nelson-Siegel technique to bootstrap the maturities of the risk-free curve
needed to obtain the present values of CDS that we use in the arbitrage strategies.
We apply a filter to the sample, excluding those countries which report an excessive
number of missing data on bond yields or CDS spreads -more than 40% of the total ob-
servations for at least one maturity- thus dropping from the sample Cyprus, Luxembourg,
and Malta. We also exclude Greece that deserves a specific analysis due to the dramatic
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turbulence experienced during the sample period. We drop from the sample Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania, as these countries change their status from Non-Eurozone to Eurozone over
the sample period. We end up with a final sample of 22 countries. In particular, 12 countries
belong to the Eurozone, and 10 are out of the Eurozone. Throughout the analysis, we also
divide the sample of the Eurozone countries in two subgroups: core, and periphery. The list
of countries is reported in table I
A. Descriptive Statistics
In table I we report data on CDS spreads and bond yields for each single country in the
sample. Table I shows that both bond yields and CDS spreads are significantly lower after
the announcement of the OMT Programme by ECB governor Mario Draghi on July 26th,
2012. The differences are significant at 5% level (except for the CDS in Slovenia), when
considering both mean and median.
In table II we report figures for the time series of mean and median across countries before
and after July 2012. We also provide a breakdown of mean and median by different group
of countries. Therefore, we observe that bond yields and CDS spreads are generally lower
for the core countries with respect to both the peripheral and the No Eurozone countries,
before and after the OMT announcement. Yet, the reduction in both spreads and yields
is significant at 5% level even for the core countries. Finally, the distance that we report
between mean and median of bond yields across countries after July 2012 is probably driven
by the presence of some outlier country over a given interval of time.
3. The CDS - Bond basis
CDS spreads and yields on a risky bond issued by the reference entity of the CDS contract
are strictly related. The CDS provides protection to the acquirer in case of default of the
reference entity, while the bond pays out yields to the bondholder as long as the reference
entity is able to comply with its obligations. In particular, Hull et al. (2004) have pointed
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Table I. Descriptive Statistics by Country
Statistics: Average Median
Before OMT After OMT Difference Before OMT After OMT Difference
Eurozone
Core:
Austria 78.19 20.22 -57.97* 3.14 1.21 -1.93*
Belgium 143.11 33.93 -109.19* 3.77 1.44 -2.33*
Finland 46.50 24.74 -21.76* 2.79 1.14 -1.65*
France 83.17 31.86 -51.31* 3.13 1.37 -1.76*
Germany 39.15 12.58 -26.57* 2.48 0.93 -1.55*
Netherlands 67.26 31.74 -35.53* 7.63 2.31 -5.31*
Peripheral:
Ireland 485.07 80.00 -405.07* 4.94 2.81 -2.13*
Italy 229.15 138.40 -90.75* 2.80 1.15 -1.65*
Portugal 633.77 247.09 -386.67* 8.85 4.35 -4.49*
Slovakia 136.00 61.90 -74.10* 4.18 1.89 -2.29*
Slovenia 164.69 168.27 3.58 5.10 2.90 -2.20*
Spain 243.27 115.66 -127.62* 5.62 3.07 -2.55*
No-Eurozone
Bulgaria 258.99 130.61 -128.39* 6.53 4.28 -2.25*
Croatia 316.38 274.95 -41.43* 3.72 1.30 -2.41*
Czech Republic 98.95 49.67 -49.28* 2.56 1.08 -1.48*
Denmark 60.44 17.83 -42.61* 7.86 4.66 -3.20*
Hungary 353.35 191.21 -162.14* 6.75 6.36 -0.39*
Norway 26.58 16.23 -10.35* 5.17 3.85 -1.32*
Poland 160.49 71.75 -88.74* 5.51 2.47 -3.04*
Romania 301.57 145.09 -156.47* 3.01 1.98 -1.02*
Sweden 36.48 12.96 -23.52* 5.79 3.45 -2.34*
UK 65.54 27.81 -37.73* 7.51 4.49 -3.02*
Legend: The table reports the figures for the descriptive statistics at country level. For each
of the two statistics analysed the table reports the figure for the period before the OMT and
for the period after the OMT the third column is the difference between the two subperiods:
(After OMT - Before OMT). The average and the median statistic are computed as the
average and the median of the whole subperiod time series for each country. The * indicates
that the difference is significant at the 5% level.

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Table II. Descriptive statistics by asset
Average of Mean Average of Median
Before OMT After OMT Difference Before OMT After OMT Difference
Overall:
CDS 183.10 86.57 -96.53* 125.70 52.40 -73.30*
Yields 4.95 2.66 -2.29* 4.70 0.24 -4.45*
Breakdown by country group:
Core
CDS 73.23 25.84 -50.39* 70.57 26.24 -44.33*
Yields 3.82 1.40 -2.42* 3.13 0.13 -3.01*
Periphery
CDS 315.33 135.22 -180.11* 239.24 125.14 -114.10
Yields 5.25 2.69 -2.55* 4.84 0.27 -4.58*
Non-Eurozone
CDS 167.88 93.81 -74.07* 129.99 60.74 -69.24*
Yields 5.44 3.39 -2.05* 5.84 0.36 -5.48*
Legend: The table reports statistics for the for the time series of CDS spreads and bond
yields before and after the OMT announcement date and their difference for the overall
sample, and separately for the three different country groups that we identified as: ”Core”,
”Periphery”, and ”No Eurozone”. The ”Average of Means” is computed as the average over
the subperiod time series of the mean CDS spread and yield in the cross section of countries
at each time t. The ”Average of Median” is computed as the average over the subperiod
time series of the median CDS spread and yield in the cross section of countries at each time
t. The * indicates that the difference is significant at the 5% level

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Figure 1. CDS spreads and Yields Dynamic
Legend: The figure reports the dynamics of average and medians of the cross section of
countries for CDS spreads and bond yields over the sample time series, at the 5-years matu-
rity, for the three different groups of countries. The blue line represents the dynamic for the
core countries of the Eurozone, the green line is for the peripheral countries of the Eurozone,
and the yellow line is the average of the cross section of No-Eurozone countries. The red line
is the OMT announcement date.

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out that, under a large set of assumptions, the T -years CDS spread should be equal to the
T -years excess yield on a risky bond, issued by the reference entity, over the T -years riskless
bond.
The reason is simple: if the assumptions listed by Hull et al. (2004) hold, a portfolio
including a T -years CDS and a T -years par yield bond, issued by the reference entity, gen-
erates cash flows equal to a T -years par yield riskless bond in all states of the world, and
so
s = y − r, (1)
where s is the T -years CDS spread, y is T -years yield on the risky bond, and r is the T -years
yield on the riskless bond. If this relationship does not hold, then an arbitrage opportunity
arises in the market by trading CDS, risky bond, and riskless asset. We will analyze later in
the paper the riskless profits generated by the potential arbitrage strategies that exploit the
violation of the equation (1).
We show now empirical evidence on the relationship between CDS spreads and risky bond
yields for our sample countries, over the time interval covered by our dataset. We group the
countries in the three sub-samples: Eurozone-Core (EC), Eurozone-Periphery (EP), and No-
Eurozone (NZ). We define as basis the difference between the T -years CDS spread and the
T -years excess yield on a risky bond, issued by the reference entity, over the T -years riskless
bond.
Figure 2 shows the dynamics of the basis for each country. The EC countries have basis
substantially lower than the EP countries and the NZ countries. More importantly, the
basis of both the core and periphery countries of the Eurozone converge to zero right after
the OMT announcement, and then remains around zero over the following years. The NZ
countries, instead, do not show the same convergence in terms of basis, and appear to be
spread around the zero in a similar way before and after the OMT announcement.
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Figure 2. CDS spreads - Bond Yields basis
Legend: The figure reports the dynamics of the basis (CDS spread - Bond Yield) for each
country over the sample time series, at the 5-years maturity, for the three different groups
of countries. The basis is expressed in percentage terms, i.e. basis points divided by 10000.
The red line is the OMT announcement date.
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This result is also evident looking at the average of the absolute basis across groups
of countries. Table III reports that the absolute basis has substantially reduced for the
Eurozone countries in the second period of the time series(-65% for the EC, -55% for the
PC, respectively), while the decrease is much lower for the NZ countries (-10%).
Table III. Average Absolute Basis (CDS spreads - Bond Yields)
Euro - Core Euro - Periphery No Eurozone
Before OMT 0.0063 0.0078 0.105
After OMT 0.0022 0.0036 0.090
Legend: The basis is expressed in percentage terms, i.e. basis points divided by 10000.
Both CDS spreads and Bond yields are at 5-years maturity

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4. CDS-implied bond yields
In this section, we estimate a credit risk structural model in order to determine the
risky bond yield of a country consistent with the country’s default risk priced in the CDS
spreads of the country. The procedure that we adopt is the following: first, we reconstruct
the unobservable dynamics of the leverage, defined as debt/asset ratio, of each country, by
performing a non-linear Kalman filter, and using the CDS spreads as observable variables.
The Kalman filter enables to retrieve the dynamics of a latent variable, by using an observable
variable and the ex-ante known relationship between the two variables. The relationship
between the observed and the unobserved variables forms the measurement equation, while
the evolution over time of the latent variable is called transition equation. We estimate the
model parameters by adopting a quasi-maximum likelihood algorithm, in conjunction with
the Kalman filter. Details of the estimation methodology are provided in Appendix A.
Then, we perform Monte Carlo (MC) simulations to compute the implied yields on a risky
zero-coupon bond, for each country, over the sample time series. In the MC simulations, for
each country, we use the dynamics of the leverage, and the estimates of the model parameters,
of the first step. In the next subsection, we describe the underlying model, then we briefly
introduce the Kalman filter applied to our estimation problem. In the last subsection, we
detail the MC simulations, and we describe the implied yields obtained from the simulations.
A. Underlying Model
The asset value of the i -th country is described by a geometric Brownian motion on the
filtered probability space (Ω,F , {Ft : t ≥ 0},P):
dVi,t = µViVidt+ σViVidWi,t,
where µVi and σVi are the P-drift and diffusion constant coefficients, Wi,t is a standard
Brownian motion under the physical probability measure P .
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We define the i -th market value of leverage as Li,t = ln
(
Fi
Vi,t
)
, following an arithmetic
Brownian motion,
dLi,t = µLidt− σLidWi,t, (2)
where µLi = −
(
µVi − 12σ2Vi
)
is the P-leverage drift coefficient, and σLi = σVi is the leverage
diffusion component. As result of the inverse relationship between the asset and the lever-
age values, the minus before the diffusion component stands for the perfect and negative
correlation between the Brownian motions of the asset value and the leverage dynamics.
In the first-passage time framework, default occurs as soon as the asset value crosses
from above a constant and deterministic barrier Ci, that we assume to be below the face
value of the debt, at any time s, with t ≤ s ≤ T , where T is the outstanding debt maturity.
The country’s default risk is priced in the credit default swaps (CDS) issued with different
maturity τj, with j going from 1 to J , where the longest maturity τJ matches the debt
maturity T . In a CDS contract, the protection buyer pays a fixed premium each period until
either the default event or the contract expiration, and the protection seller is committed to
buy back from the buyer the defaulted bond at its par value.
Therefore, the price of the CDS, i.e. the premium (the spread) paid by the insurance
buyer, is defined at the inception date of the contract in order to equate the expected value
of the two contractual legs. Then, by assuming the existence of a default-free money market
account appreciating at a constant continuous interest rate r, and M periodical payments
occurring during one year, the CDS spread γ with time-to-maturity τj, priced at t = 0, solves
the following equation:
M∑
m=1
T
γ
M
exp
(
−r m
M
)
EQ0 [1t∗>mM ] = EQ0 [exp(−rt∗)α1t∗<τj ],
where t∗ stands for the time of default, α is the amount paid by the protection seller
to the protection buyer in case of default, and EQ0 indicates that the expectation is taken
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under the risk-neutral measure Q. Therefore, EQ0 [1t∗<τj ] is the probability that the country
defaults at any time before τj, that is the probability that the asset value crosses from above
the barrier Ci. At t, this probability is equal to:
PDQi,t(τj) = Φ
(
Ki + Li,t −
(
r − 1
2
σ2Li
)
(τj − t)
σLi
√
(τj − t)
)
+ exp
(
(Ki + Li,t)
(
2r
σ2Li
− 1
))
Φ
(
(Ki + Li,t) +
(
r − 1
2
σ2Li
)
(τj − t)
σLi
√
(τj − t)
)
, (3)
if τj < T , otherwise
PDQi,t(τJ) = 1− Φ
(
−Li,t +
(
r − 1
2
σ2Li
)
(τJ − t)
σLi
√
(τJ − t)
)
+ exp
(
(Ki + Li,t)
(
2r
σ2Li
− 1
))
Φ
(
(2Ki + Li,t) +
(
r − 1
2
σ2Li
)
(τJ − t)
σLi
√
(τJ − t)
)
, (4)
as τJ = T , and we have to consider not only the early bankruptcy risk as in the equation
(2), but also the probability of the country not being able to pay back the outstanding debt
Fi at time T , even though the asset value never crossed the default boundary.
Φ stands for the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal variable, and
Ki = ln
(
Ci
Fi
)
. As the default barrier is below the face value of the debt, Ki assumes only
negative values. The larger is the magnitude of the absolute value of Ki, the larger is the
distance between the face value of the debt Fi and the default barrier Ci.
B. Model Estimation
We formulate our problem in a state-space model, where the measurement equations
come from (2)-(3). The noise terms associated with the CDS implied-default probability for
different time to maturities τj are assumed to be uncorrelated, and with equal variance.
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PDQi,t(τj) = g (Li,t;Ki, σLi) + ϵi,t(τj), [j = 1, 5, 10]
where the time to maturity is expressed in years, and j = 10 stands for the maturity T of
the outstanding debt Fi (i.e., 10 years). The function g defines the non-linear relationships
between the observable and the latent variable, and ϵi,t(τa) is the measurement noise associ-
ated with the CDS implied-default probability equation and the time horizon j. These four
measurement noises, for each country i, are assumed to follow a multivariate normal distri-
bution, with zero mean, and diagonal covariance matrix Ri. We assume a homoscedastic
covariance matrix, which is country-varying.
On the other side, the transition equation describes the evolution of the country’s lever-
age. It follows from the discretization of the stochastic process defined in (1):
Li,t+δt = Li,t + µLiδt+ ηi,t+δt,
where ηi,t+δt = σLi(Wi,t −Wi,t+δt) v N (0, Qi) is the transition error, and Qi = σ2Liδt.
The dynamics of Li,t, and the parameters of the model, such as the parameters of the
leverage dynamics (µLi , σLi) and Ki, are then estimated by performing a non-linear Kalman
filter in conjunction with quasi-maximum likelihood estimation. For parsimony, the steps to
implement the non-linear Kalman filter, and the construction of the likelihood function, are
described in details in the Appendix A.
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Figure 3. Leverage, CDS spreads and Bond Yields. Eurozone Countries
Legend: The figure shows the dynamics of the leverage of the country (blue line), as de-
fined in the equation (1), reconstructed for each country by using the Kalman filter, the
5-years CDS spreads (dashed line) and the 5-years bond yields (red line), both expressed in
percentage terms, i.e. basis points divided by 10000

Figure 3 provides an idea of the estimation results, thus comparing the reconstructed
dynamics of the leverage, for the European countries, over the sample time series, against
the observed dynamics of the 5-years CDS spreads and the 5-years observed bond yields.
The dynamics of both CDS spreads and bond yields is in line with the dynamics of the
country’s leverage. When the CDS spreads and the bond yields reach very low values, in
particular in the last part of the time series, then we estimate a leverage that moves far away
from zero, towards negative values.
C. Monte Carlo simulations
The implied risky yields, for each point in time t, and each country, are obtained as
average over the results of 10000 simulations. In particular, for each point in time t, and
each country, we simulate the dynamics of the leverage for a time interval going from t to
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t+K ∗ 360, where K is the maturity of the bond expressed in years.
The leverage of a country is simulated by using the equation (2), where dt is one day step,
the parameters of the stochastic process are the estimates obtained in the previous step, and
we use the estimated leverage for the time t as starting point of the simulated dynamics.
We generate K ∗ 360 normally distributed random numbers for each country to simulate the
daily increment of the Brownian motion, thus finally obtaining a simulated dynamics of the
country’s leverage of length K ∗ 360.
Then, we use the condition of default implied by the model. The country defaults if
Vi,t < C, that corresponds to Li,t > (−Ki). Therefore, if the simulated leverage of the
country, at least for one point in time over the simulation time horizon, is above −Ki, we
impose that the bond defaults and the t-value of the bond is zero. Otherwise, the t-value of
the bond is equal to the risk-free discount factor, by using the risk-free rate at time t.
We then compute the bond price for each time t averaging across the 10000 simulations,
and the corresponding yield by simple inversion. Let define B the price of the bond obtained
with MC simulations, then the implied yield Y is equal to
Y = log
(
1/B
K ∗ 360
)
5. Empirical Analysis
We now carry on our empirical analysis by combining the information on the CDS spreads
and the observed bond yields with the estimation of the model-implied bond yields. We
disentangle the main question of the paper from three different points of view. First, we
study the distance between observed and implied risky yields for each country. Then, we
study the correlation between CDS spreads and bond yields, by using both observed and
implied yields. The correlation is examined across countries for each point in time (cross-
sectional correlation), and for each country over time (time-series correlation). Finally, we
test the consistency of the risky bond yields in terms of default risk priced in the CDS
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spreads, by constructing riskless arbitrage strategies, and we verify whether the strategies
are profitable.
A. Implied and Observed Bond Yields
The difference between observed and implied risky yields should be zero for each country,
and each point in time, if the observed risky yields of a country are consistent with the default
risk priced in the CDS spreads of the country. Indeed, the maintained assumption behind
this statement is that the model-implied yields are well estimated, and the model is able to
fully capture whatever drives the relationship between default risk and bond prices. With
these caveats in mind, we compare observed and implied yields for each country, over the
sample time-series.
Figure 4-6 show that the estimated yields are generally closer to the observed yields for
the Eurozone countries with respect to the No Eurozone countries. Within the Eurozone
group (Figure 4), we obtain implied yields that are very close to the observed yields for the
core countries in the second part of the time series. At the opposite, the NZ countries show
a persistent deviation of the estimated yields from the observed yields over the entire time
series.
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Figure 4. Implied versus Observed Yields. Eurozone
Legend: The figure shows the observed (blue line) and the implied (red line) yields, at
5-years maturity, for each country in the Eurozone group, over the sample time series. The
implied yields are obtained by implementing the steps of the estimation methodology de-
scribed in section 4

Figure 5. Implied versus Observed Yields. No Eurozone
Legend: The figure shows the observed (blue line) and the implied (red line) yields, at
5-years maturity, for each country in the No Eurozone group, over the sample time series.
The implied yields are obtained by implementing the steps of the estimation methodology
described in section 4

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The additional straightforward consequence of a perfect equality between observed and
implied risky yields would be that the differences in the observed risky yields across countries
are perfectly consistent with the differences in the default risk priced in the CDS spreads,
under the assumption that the differences across countries in terms of default risk are well
reflected by the model on the differences across bond yields.
Indeed, this assumption is very strong and not strictly necessary for the purpose of our
analysis. What we actually aim to investigate is whether the differences in the observed
yields across countries are in line with the differences in the yields derived by the model
estimates, thus implied by the CDS spreads.
Therefore, we define the observed risky bond yield as the sum of the unobservable true
yield and the mispricing currently arising in the market. We define true yield as the yield
that should be paid by the risky bond in absence of any market distortion and friction, thus
being perfectly consistent with the default risk of the country.
Yˆi,t = Yi,t + εi,t,
where Yˆi,t is the observed yield, Yi,t is the true yield, and εi,t is the market mispricing, for
each country i, and each point in time t. The true yield is indeed unobservable, therefore
we assume that the true yield is the sum of an observable proxy and an error:
Yi,t = Y˜i,t + ηi,t,
where the error term ηi,t is proportional to the current level of the true yield proxy, for a
given constant k to be estimated. Thus, we have:
Yˆi,t = (1 + k)Y˜i,t + εi,t = βY˜i,t + εi,t, (5)
where k is assumed to be constant across countries and time. Therefore, we can estimate
the equation (5) with a panel regression, where i goes from 1 to 22, and t goes from 1 to T ,
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Table IV. Panel Regression - Observed and True Yield
Obs Yield Obs Yield
Model Yield 0.882***
(0.0014)
Basis Yield 1.052***
(0.0016)
N 40656 40656
R2 0.73 0.85
Legend: The table reports the results of the panel data regression of the observed risky
bond yields against the proxy of the unobservable risky bond true yields. The Model Yield
is the result of the MC simulations using the model estimates, and the Basis Yield is the
theoretical true yield given by the zero-basis condition. The stars over the coefficient stand
for a 1% significance level, and we report in brackets the standard errors.
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where T is the length of the sample time series (i.e., 1850 daily observations).
We adopt two specifications for the true yield proxy. First, we use the theoretical true
yield given by the zero-basis condition described in equation (1). The second proxy is
instead the yield implied by the model estimation and generated by MC simulations. The
corresponding error terms are then easy to interpret. As for the first proxy, the error is given
by the strong set of assumption at the base of the zero-basis condition, while the error in
the second proxy is the result of the model assumptions and the estimation error.
Two additional consequences of (5) are straightforward. First, the closer is the regression
β to 1, the closer the error term of the proxy is to zero. Moreover, the bond yield market
mispricing is simply measured by the regression residuals.
Table IV reports a value of the coefficient close to 1 for both the true yield proxies. Then,
we generate the regression residuals for both the equations estimates, and we compare them
in the next plot.
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Figure 6. Regression Residuals and Basis. Eurozone
Legend: The figure shows the residuals of the panel regression (5) by using the two different
true yield proxies, and the CDS spread/Bond Yield basis, for the Eurozone countries, over
the sample time series
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Figure 6 shows that both the regression residuals and the CDS spread/Bond Yield basis
are very close to each other for all the countries, and over the entire time series, supporting
the interpretation of the regression coefficients close to 1. Moreover, measuring the market
mispricing by using either the observed basis or the regression residuals does not lead to
great differences. We report here only the results for the Eurozone, but equivalent results
hold for the No-Eurozone countries.
B. Correlations Analysis
If the distance in terms of default risk across countries is consistently reflected on the
distance in terms of risky yields across countries, then the cross-sectional correlation between
CDS spreads and risky bond yields should be close to 1. When the CDS spread of the country
A is higher than the CDS spread of the country B, then the yield on a bond issued by A
117
must be higher than the yield on a bond issued by B. Such a relationship should hold across
the whole set of countries, therefore the cross-sectional correlation between CDS spreads and
risky bond yields should be close to 1, for each point in time.
In fact, if we compute the cross-sectional correlation between CDS spreads and risky bond
yields by using the theoretical yield implied by the zero-basis condition, this correlation is
always equal to 1, for each point in time.
However, computing only the correlation between CDS spreads and observed bond yields
is not enough to rule out the distress puzzle. In particular, the monotonicity of bond yields
is a necessary but not sufficient condition to rule out the distress puzzle. We require, in
fact, that the relationship between CDS spreads and observed bond yields across countries
is not only monotonic, but also that the size of the differences in terms of default risk across
countries is reflected in the size of the differences in the risky yields. The rationale behind this
condition is that a country might be paying a disproportionately high or low yield compared
to what the default risk priced in the CDS would imply, without violating the monotonicity
condition.
Therefore, we proceed as follows. First, we deduct the estimated implied yields from the
actual yields for each country, thus obtaining a net yield. Once the observed yields have
been adjusted by deducting the corresponding implied yields, we can evaluate whether the
monotonicity condition still holds, by computing the Spearman’s correlation between CDS
spreads and the net yields across countries, for each point in time. As result, we generate
a series of cross-sectional correlations over time, between CDS spreads and net yields. The
closer is the correlation to one, then the closer is the market to ruling out the distress puzzle.
We adopt the Spearman’s index of correlation as it fits much better the goal of our analysis,
by evaluating the monotonic relationships between two variables, regardless whether the
relationship is linear or not.
The intuition for this approach is simple. If the excess bond yield of the riskier country,
in fact, is too low than it should be, then the net yield of the safer country would be higher
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than the net yield of the riskier country. The result is a not monotonic relationship between
CDS spreads and net yields. However, if the observed distance between the bond yields of
two countries is too high, then the monotonic relationship between CDS spreads and net
yields still holds. Hence, we say that the correlation analysis is able to detect only if there
is a sufficient distance between bond yields, across countries. However, as a consequence, if
the distance between the bond yields of two countries is too high, then it is likely that the
distance between the yields of one of the two countries and a third country’s bond yield is
too low, thus returning at the end a lower value of the correlation coefficient.
The next figure represents graphically the main result of the paper. Figure 7 shows
the dynamics of the cross-sectional correlations between the 5-years CDS spreads and the
estimated bond yields (blue line), the observed bond yields (red line), and the net yields (red
line), for the Eurozone and the No-Eurozone countries, respectively. Moreover, the bottom
plots report the corresponding p-values associated to the test on the statistical significance
of the correlation.
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Figure 7. CDS spreads - Bond Yields. Cross-sectional correlations
Legend: The top plots show the correlation between CDS spreads and implied (blue line),
estimated (red line), and net (yellow line) yields (yellow)at 5-years maturity, for each point
in time, across Eurozone (top left) and No Eurozone countries (top right). The bottom plots
show the corresponding p-value, and the red line is the OMT announcement date
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The top plots show that the correlation of the CDS spreads with both observed and
implied yields is close to 1, over all the time series, and for both groups of countries. This
result is natural for the implied yields, that are estimated by using the CDS spreads. Though,
the correlation is not perfectly equal to 1, as the model is subject to an error, and because
the yields are then generated by MC simulations still subject to an error. On the other hand,
this result documents that also the relationship between CDS spreads and actual yields is
monotonically positive, as it should be. This means that riskier countries issue bonds with
higher yields.
However, this result does not imply that the distress puzzle is ruled out. What really
matter is the dynamics of the red line, where we analyse the presence of a monotonic rela-
tionship between CDS spreads and bond yields, only after adjusting the observed yields by
using the implied yields.
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Indeed, the key result arises when we focus on the correlation between CDS spreads and
net yields. This correlation, in fact, randomly moves around zero for the Eurozone countries
before the OMT announcement, and approaches 1 right after the OMT announcement,
thus remaining stable afterwards. It turns out that the sovereign bond yields were not
consistent with the size of the distance in terms of default risk across countries before the
OMT announcement, and that right after the announcement the consistency in terms of
differences in the bond yields across countries is restored.
This result is even more interesting and stronger if we compare Eurozone and No Eurozone
countries. In fact, the NZ countries do not show any change in the cross-sectional correlation
between CDS spreads and net yields over the entire period. The correlation is quite stable
over the entire time series, however never approaching 1. Moreover, the jump in the cross-
sectional correlation across the Eurozone countries is also highlighted by the jump towards
zero of the corresponding p-value. Therefore, after the OMT announcement, the correlation
between CDS spreads and net yields is always significantly different from zero, whereas before
the OMT we observe large and very volatile p-values.
Table V. Correlation CDS spreads - Bond Yields
Eurozone No Eurozone
Obs Yields Imp Yields Net Yields Obs Yields Imp Yields Net Yields
Before OMT 0.883 0.938 0.367 0.956 0.895 0.737
(0.0027) (0.0001) (0.2755) (0.0004) (0.0017) (0.0258)
After OMT 0.951 0.927 0.885 0.978 0.818 0.683
0.0000 0.0001 0.0008 0.0000 0.0082 0.0439
Legend: The table reports the average cross-sectional correlation of the CDS spreads and
Observed Yields, Implied Yields, and Net Yields (Observed Yields - Implied Yields) for the
5-years time horizon, across Eurozone and No-Eurozone countries, and within the pre and the
post OMT announcement. We first compute the series of the cross-sectional correlations over
the sample period for each group of countries, and then we compute the average within each
of the two time intervals (before/after OMT announcement. The same method is applied to
compute the p-values, that we report in parentheses

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Table V reports the average correlation, for the different measures of bond yields, across
countries in each group, and within each time interval (before/after the OMT announce-
ment). The average correlation between CDS spreads and both actual and implied yields
is very close to 1 for both groups, and in each period. Instead, the average correlation
across Eurozone countries between CDS spreads and net yields is more than double in the
second period with respect to the first period, thus approaching 1. On the other side, this
correlation is very similar across the two periods for the NZ countries, and is even lower
after the OMT announcement. Moreover, the corresponding average p-value is large for the
Eurozone countries before the OMT announcement, and approaches zero after the OMT
announcement.
C. Arbitrage Strategies
In this section, we examine two potential arbitrage strategies that exploit riskless profit
opportunities. We show that the intervention of the ECB drastically reduced these oppor-
tunities for the Eurozone countries. We compare the arbitrage profits across Eurozone and
No Eurozone countries, and we show that for the second set of countries, instead, the OMT
announcement does not generate any difference in the potential arbitrage profits over the
sample time series.
Before looking at the strategies, we recall the definition of the no-arbitrage condition,
obtained from the definition of the basis that we used in the previous section of the paper.
s = y − r, (6)
where s is the T -years CDS spread, y is T -years yield on the risky bond, and r is the
T -years yield on the riskless bond. If this relationship does not hold, then an arbitrage
opportunity arises in the market by trading CDS, risky bond, and riskless asset, under a set
of assumptions exhaustively explained in Hull et al. (2004). Here we report only the most
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relevant assumptions that support the flow of our argument.
1. Market participants can short sovereign bonds
2. Market participants can short the risk-free bond (they can borrow money at the risk-
free rate)
3. The ”cheapest-to-deliver bond” option is ruled out, so that the profit is not affected by
the ability of the protection seller to find a cheaper bond to deliver in case of default
4. The recovery rate of the bond in case of default is equal to zero
In order to compute the profits, we express all the variables in monetary terms, thus
computing the present value of the CDS, the risk-free bond and the risky bond by using
continuous compounding, such that the no-arbitrage condition can be rewritten as follows
PCDS = PBY − PRF ,
where PCDS, PBY , PRF denote the present value of the CDS, the risky bond, and the riskless
bond, respectively, and we omit the subscripts i and t to save in notation.
Strategy 1: The first arbitrage strategy is based on the CDS spread-bond yield basis.
Suppose that for the i-th country, at time t,
PCDS > PBY − PRF
,
then the arbitrageur can sell the risk-free asset, and purchase the CDS and the risky
bond issued by the CDS reference entity. The mispricing of the bond generates a positive
difference, that is exactly the risk-free arbitrage profit. Conversely, if
PCDS < PBY − PRF
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the arbitrageur obtains the same arbitrage profit by reversing the strategy. In practice, the
arbitrageur purchases the risk free asset, and sells the mispriced risky bond and the CDS to
obtain the risk-free profit.
Figure 8 shows the arbitrage profits potentially obtained on a portfolio where each i-th
country has equal weight in the portfolio. The panel on the left shows the profits that an
arbitrageur could obtain by trading on Eurozone sovereign bonds, and the panel on the right
shows potential profits by trading No Eurozone sovereign bonds. The profits are large and
volatile before the OMT Programme announcement in both the Eurozone and No Eurozone
areas. After the announcement, however, the profits drop immediately and start to converge
towards zero for the Eurozone countries, whereas they remain positive and volatile for the
countries out of the Eurozone.
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Figure 8. Arbitrage Profits - Strategy 1
Legend: The figure shows the arbitrage profits that could be made on an equally weighted
portfolio of sovereign CDS and bonds using strategy 1 described in the paper, over the sample
time series. The profits are expressed in monetary terms assuming nominal value of 1 for the
bonds, and where the CDS price is computed as present value of the CDS spreads expressed
in percentage terms.
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Strategy 2: The second strategy exploits the deviation of the observed yields from the
yields implied by the model estimates, that are consequently consistent with the default risk
priced in the CDS spreads which are used to estimate the model. We compute the difference
between observed and estimated risky bond yields, at each time t for each country i, and
we calculate the unconditional mean of those differences for each country, which we consider
the benchmark to which the difference should tend to.
Then, at time t, for the country i, if the difference between observed and estimated yield
is above the i-th country’s unconditional mean, we say that the i-th bond is undervalued at
t, whereas if the difference between observed and estimated yield is below the i-th country’s
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unconditional mean, we say that the i-th bond is overvalued at t.
If the i-th country is undervalued, the arbitrageur can sell the risk-free asset, and purchase
the CDS and the risky bond issued by the CDS reference entity. Otherwise, if the i-th country
is overvalued, the arbitrageur purchases the risk free asset, and sells the mispriced risky bond
and the CDS to obtain the risk-free profit.
The implementation of the strategy 2, then, works exactly as for the strategy 1, in terms
of long-short portfolio. The difference between the two strategies is the signal of the opening
of a riskless profit opportunity. While in the strategy 1 the signal is the non-zero basis at a
given point in time, for a given country, the strategy 2 has the distance between observed
and estimated yield as key driver.
In figure 9, we compare the potential profits obtained with the strategy 2 by trading
on Eurozone and No Eurozone countries, respectively, with an equally weighted portfolio
of countries-bonds. The profits plotted in figure 9 are very similar with those presented in
figure 8, for both sets of countries. Therefore, the second arbitrage strategy supports our
interpretation of the outcome generated by the OMT programme in terms of sovereign bonds
market mispricing for the Eurozone countries.
Finally, table VI and table VII report the mean and the standard deviation of the po-
tential profits obtained with the two arbitrage strategies, before and after the OMT an-
nouncement, and for the Eurozone and the No Eurozone countries, respectively. Table VI
reports the results for the Eurozone countries, and shows a pronounced difference in the
average profits between the two subperiods. Further, the standard deviation drops sensibly
after the announcement. Such numbers indicate that after the OMT announcement the
arbitrage opportunities were approximately absent, or immediately cleared. Instead, for the
No Eurozone area, table VII reports similar figures for mean and standard deviation, across
the periods before and after the OMT announcement. All the differences reported are not
statistically different from zero.
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Figure 9. Arbitrage Profits - Strategy 2
Legend: The figure shows the arbitrage profits that could be made on an equally weighted
portfolio of sovereign CDS and bonds using strategy 2 described in the paper, over the sample
time series. The profits are expressed in monetary terms assuming nominal value of 1 for the
bonds, and where the CDS price is computed as present value of the CDS spreads expressed
in percentage terms.
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Table VI. Arbitrage Profits. Eurozone
Statistic: Before OMT After OMT Difference
Strategy 1
Mean 0.034 0.014 -0.020*
Std. Dev. 0.012 0.005
Strategy 2
Mean 0.029 0.003 -0.027*
Std. Dev. 0.012 0.005
Legend: The table reports the mean and the standard deviation of the profits due to the
arbitrage strategy applied to the Eurozone countries before and after the OMT announce-
ment date. In the last column the difference between the two subsamples statistic is reported
(After OMT-Before OMT). The * indicates that the difference is significant at 5% level

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Table VII. Arbitrage Profits. No Eurozone
Statistic: Before OMT After OMT Difference
Strategy 1
Mean 0.036 0.036 -0.000
Std. Dev. 0.006 0.006
Strategy 2
Mean 0.020 0.012 -0.008
Std. Dev. 0.013 0.017
Legend: The table reports the mean and the standard deviation of the profits due to
the arbitrage strategy applied to the No Eurozone countries before and after the OMT
announcement date. In the last column the difference between the two subsamples statistic
is reported (After OMT-Before OMT). The * indicates that the difference is significant at
5% level
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6. Conclusion
In the paper, we conduct an empirical investigation of the relationship between sovereign
CDS spreads and sovereign bond yields. In a nutshell, we document that, after the launch of
the OMT programme by the ECB, the consistent relationship between CDS spreads and bond
yields across Eurozone countries was restored, differently from the No-Eurozone countries,
which instead show a persistent deviation from the theoretical equilibrium relationship over
the entire sample period.
We shed light on the effects of the unconventional monetary policy of the ECB on the
CDS-bond relationship, and more in general on the consistent risk-return relationship in
the sovereign context, with different approaches, that produce a unified and homogenous
evidence on the behaviour of the sovereign credit risk market prior and following the launch
of the programme, and across groups of countries.
Further investigation should focus on the big challenge of isolating the long term effects
of the OMT programme on the relative pricing of the sovereign credit securities, in order
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to prove and identify a robust causal relationship. The main issue in a sovereign analysis is
created by the unavoidable interaction between external and internal factors simultaneously
at work. With this paper, we want to highlight a crucial evidence for the analysis of the
risk-return relationship, linking this cornerstone of the financial theory with macro-economic
and monetary events, then awaiting for further and deeper research.
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A. Kalman filter and Quasi-Maximum Likelihood
Estimation
In a general formulation, with a non-linear relationship between the measurement and
the state variables, the state-space model is defined by two sets of equations, the transition
and the measurement equation, respectively:
Xi,t+δt = Xi,t + ci + ϵi,t+δt,
Yi,t+δt = ψ(Xi,t+δt) + ui,t+δt,
where Xi,t+δt is the i-th observation of the state variable at time t+δt, ci is the time-invariant
component driving the evolution of the state variable, ϵi,t+δt is the transition error on the
i-th observation of the state variable at time t + δt. On the other hand, Yi,t+δt is the i-th
observation of the measurement variable at time t+δt, ψ is the measurement function which
links the observable and the latent variable, and ui,t+δt is the measurement error.
For a Gaussian state-space model, under standard assumptions, the discrete Kalman filter
is proved to be the minimum mean squared error estimator. However, in the case of non-
linear relation between the measurement and the state variable, the classic linear Kalman
filter is not longer optimal. One possible solution is to linearize the estimation around the
current estimate by using the partial derivatives of the process and measurement functions.
To linearize the measurement process, we need to compute the derivatives of ψ with respect
to
(a) the state variable: Hi,j =
∂ψi
∂Xj
(X˜t, 0),
where H is the Jacobian matrix of partial derivatives of the generic measurement function
ψ(·) with respect to the state variable X, and X˜t is the current estimate of the state.
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(b) the measurement noise: H˘i,j =
∂ψi
∂νj
(X˜t, 0),
where H˜ is the Jacobian matrix of partial derivatives of ψ(·) with respect to the noise term
ν.
Once the linearization has been completed, we can implement the discrete Kalman filter
in the usual steps. First, we need to set the initial conditions :
λi,0 Pi,0,
where Pi,t := var[Xi,t − λi,t] is the variance of the estimation error, and λi,t is the estimate
of the state at time t based on the information available up to time t. Then, the filter imple-
mentation is based upon two sets of equations, the predicting equations, and the updating
equations, that must be repeated for each time step in the data sample.
 State Prediction
λi,t+δt/t = λi,t + ci,
and
Pi,t+δt/t = Pi,t +Qi,
where λi,t+δt/t is the estimate of the state at time t + δt based on the information available
up to time t, and Qi is the covariance of the transition noise.
 Measurement Update
λi,t+δt = λi,t+δt/t + Pi,t+δt/tH
′
i,t+δtZ
−1
i,t+δt
(
Yi,t+δt − ψ(λi,t+δt/t)
)
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Pi,t+δt = Pi,t+δt/t − Pi,t+δt/tH ′i,t+δtZ−1i,t+δtHi,t+δtPi,t+δt/t
Zi,t+δt = Hi,t+δtPi,t+δt/tH
′
i,t+δt +Ri,
where H stands for the Jacobian matrix of partial derivatives of the generic measurement
function ψ with respect to the state variable X, Zi,t+δt is the covariance matrix of the
prediction errors at time t + δt. The prediction errors are defined as vi,t+δt = Yi,t+δt −
ψ(λi,t+δt/t), where Yi,t+δt is the observation of the measurement variable at time t+ δt.
The parameters that describe the dynamics of the transition and the measurement equa-
tions (i.e., hyperparameters) are unknown, and need to be estimated.
Let rewrite the state-space model as follows:
(yt+δt, xt+δt) = (xt, {θ}), {θ} = {θ(f); θ(g)}
, where yt+δt is the observable variable at time t + δt, xt+δt is the state variable at time
t + δt, {θ(f)} is the set of unknown parameters in the transition equation, and {θ(g)} is the
set of unknown parameters in the measurement equation. The measurement and transition
equations of the system are:
g(yt+δt, α) = ϕ(xt+δt, β) + ϵt+δt, ϵt v N (0, σ2ϵ )
xt+δt = f(xt, γ) + ηt+δt, ηt v N (0, σ2η)
Then,
{θ(f)} = {γ, σ2η}
{θ(g)} = {α, β, σ2ϵ}
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We assume that the nonlinear regression disturbance, ϵt, is normally distributed:
f(ϵt) =
1√
2πσ2ϵ
exp
[
− ϵ
2
t
2σ2ϵ
]
By transformation of variable, the density of yt is given by
f(yt) = f(ϵt)
⏐⏐⏐⏐∂ϵt∂yt
⏐⏐⏐⏐ , ∂ϵt∂yt = ∂g(yt, α)∂yt
Then, the density of yt is
f(yt) =
1√
2πσ2ϵ
exp
[
−(g(yt, α)− ϕ(xt, β))
2
2σ2ϵ
] ⏐⏐⏐⏐∂g(yt, α)∂yt
⏐⏐⏐⏐
The log-likelihood function for observation t is
lnΩt (yt; {θ}) = −1
2
ln(2π)− 1
2
ln(σ2ϵ )−
(g(yt, α)− ϕ(xt, β))2
2σ2ϵ
+ ln
⏐⏐⏐⏐∂g(yt, α)∂yt
⏐⏐⏐⏐ ,
and the log-likelihood function for t = 1, 2, ..., T observations (i.e., δt = 1) is
lnΩ =
T∑
t=1
lnΩt (yt; {θ}) = −T
2
ln(2π)− T
2
ln(σ2ϵ )−
1
2σ2ϵ
T∑
t=1
(g(yt, α)− ϕ(xt, β))2
+
T∑
t=1
ln
⏐⏐⏐⏐∂g(yt, α)∂yt
⏐⏐⏐⏐
As long as g(yt, α) = yt, then
f(yt) = f(ϵt)⇒ lnΩt (yt; {θ}) = lnΩt (ϵt; {θ})
The last term in the log-likelihood function is equal to zero, and the space of the hyper-
parameters to be estimated is reduced to:
{θ(f)} = {γ, σ2η}
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{θ(g)} = {β, σ2ϵ}
In practice, the iteration of the filter generates a measurement-system prediction error,
and a prediction error variance at each step. Under the assumption that measurement-system
prediction errors are Gaussian, we can construct the log-likelihood function as follows:
lnΩ(yt; {θ}) = ln
T−δt∏
t=0
p
(
yt+δt/t
)
=
T−δt∑
t=0
ln p
(
yt+δt/t
)
=
= −N
2
ln(2π)− 1
2
T−δt∑
t=0
ln |Zt+δt| − 1
2
T−δt∑
t=0
vt+δt
′Z−1t+δtvt+δt,
where N is the number of time steps in the data sample. Finally, this function is maximized
with respect to the unknown parameters vector {θ}. This is known as the Quasi-Maximum
Likelihood estimation, in conjunction with the non-linear Kalman filter.
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